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APRIL—JUNE 1987

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Chinese Case for Aksai Chin

SAHDEV VOHRA, ICS (RETD)

PART I

THE Chinese have provided the evidence on which they base their claim to Aksai Chin in the Report of the Chinese officials¹ "on their statements and comments made during the meetings of the officials of the two Governments" i.e., of India and China submitted in December 1960. The group of officials was set up by the two Prime Ministers during the visit of Chou En-lai to New Delhi in April 1960. This is the only time that Chinese explained the basis of claiming Aksai Chin, the area that forms a vast trijunction of nearly 15,000 square miles (that is if we include Lingzi-thang and other areas occupied by China in Eastern Ladakh). It is situated south of Khotan (called Hotien by China) in the Sinkiang Autonomous Region and Tibet Autonomous Region of China on the north and east, and by Ladakh region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the south and west.

The Chinese report makes some general observations on the basis of their claim to this area in particular and to their border claims vis a vis India in general. They reject categorically the assertion first made by Prime Minister Nehru that the border was based on treaties :- in case of Ladakh between Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other. They rejected also the principle of 'watershed' as the decisive factor for the border alignment in Ladakh. They rejected finally that any value should be attached to the unofficial records and maps, even though they quoted British travellers, explorers, etc., when they felt that they supported China's case.

¹ 'Report of the Chinese Officials (pages CR:1 to 213)' contained in the "Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundry Question", Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, February 1961.

All quotations from the 'Report of the Chinese Officials' are cited as (CR:...) otherwise the above work is quoted as (Report of the Officials:...).

The report of the Chinese begins with the axiomatic statement, repeated continually, "The Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and there is only a traditional customary boundary line between the two countries" (CR : 1). It may be useful to clarify here that they do not envisage any no-man's land to have lain between the areas ruled by India and by China in Aksai Chin or elsewhere. It is as well to clear up this point because some apologists of China have built up their case on the basis of such a view. As we shall see the Chinese assert that the areas claimed by them have been under their jurisdiction and administration for centuries. In a modification of this statement, however, they state that the boundary line must change from time to time "Owing to political, economic and other reasons" (CR : 4).

In so far as it relates to the Ladakh-Sinkiang border, the Chinese have defined the Karakoram mountains as being the boundary (CR : 1). East of them it crosses the Chip Chap river, the Galwan river and then follows in a south easterly direction to Kongka Pass "along the watershed between the Kurang-tsangpo river and its tributary the Changlung river" (CR : 1). Regarding the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, it is claimed to turn south-west "along the mountain ridge, crosses the junction of the Chang-chenmo river and the Silung-Barma river, ascends the mountain ridge again and passes through Mount Tamate (approximately 78° 35' E 34 10' N), continues southward along the Changchenmo mountain" (CR : 1). We need not pursue it further for our present purpose of defining the Chinese claim on Aksai Chin.

As mentioned already, the Chinese rejected India's "geographical" principle of the boundary in the "high mountainous regions" being the watershed as "running counter to the facts of history...for people living in the mountainous regions, high mountains are not necessarily an absolute barrier to their activities, (particularly when there are rivers or passes cutting across the mountain ridges" (CR : 3-4). To drive home the point they add, "suffice it to mention the fact of China's Tibetan nationality having spread to many places on the southern side of the Himalayas, and the administrative jurisdiction of the Tibet region of China having extended to these places" (CR : 3-4). They pointed out that India's own alignment in the western sector does not follow the watershed principle and jumps from the Karakoram mountains to the Kuen-Lun mountains, cuts across the main river in the area, the Qara Qash river" (CR : 4).

The Aksai Chin was claimed by China as part of Sinkiang, although earlier in history the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang had not claimed it as such.² Regarding the possession of the area, the Chinese pointed out that it was through the area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the latter half of the 1950 entered the Ari district of Tibet from Sinkiang" (CR : 31-32). "The fact that the southern boundary of Hotien lies along the Karakoram mountains is of long historical standing. Authoritative Chinese official annals have recorded that jurisdiction up to the mountains, i.e., the Karakoram mountains (also termed Tsung-Ling), around the sources of the Karakash river" (CR : 33). Thus the Tsung-Ling or alternatively the Nimangyi given as the boundary in the 18th and 19th century annals and maps are infact the Karakoram mountains which are the source of the Karakash river. As for maps the final proof are two Chinese military maps of 1918, and 1943. "These are two most precise maps printed before China's liberation from which the specific location of the traditional customary line maintained by China can be most clearly seen" (CR : 34).

The Chinese next mention the peoples of Sinkiang being Uighurs and Khirghiz for centuries having "engaged in Salt mining and hunting in this entire area" (CR : 35). They point out that all such places as "Haji Langar, Segs Kol, Khitai Dawan, Lingzitang, Chungtash and Kizil Jilan... This is born out by Turkic Language names of geographical features such as Karakoram, Karakash, Aksai Chin and Saria Jilganang Kol" (CR : 35). The Chinese also cited a few early British maps and accounts of travellers to support the Chinese alignment, even though as stated earlier they attach no importance to their evidence.

Regarding the boundary between China's Tibet and Ladakh, the Chinese have provided the evidence separately. They quote an "authoritative Chinese official annal", the Huang-chao Hsu Wen-hsien Tung-Kao which in "volume 330 made it clear that this stretch of the traditional customary boundary touches the Karakoram mountains in the north" (CR:37). It states that Tibet "reaches up to

2 (i.e., when the British representative in Sinkiang had presented an Atlas containing a map showing Aksai Chin as part of Jammu and Kashmir in the '90's of the 19th century, the Russian Consul General Petrovsky pointed out to the Tao Tai, who told Macartnay that it formed part of Tibet.

the Karakoram mountains in the north-west, touching Hotien of Sinkiang" (CR:37)³.

The Chinese deal next with "Administration and Jurisdiction" saying that they have always held that a traditional customary line is "principally formed by the extent upto which each side has throughout history exercised its administration and jurisdiction" (CR:75). Sinkiang was made a component part of the Ching empire in 1759 formally and thus "has been even more conclusively a part of China's territory" (CR:75). In 1883 Sinkiang was formally made a province and the Hotien Special Division set up. As regards the boundary to the south, the Chinese have furnished evidence regarding Shahidulla as follows: "In 1928 the Chinese Government set up a bureau of administration at Shahidulla" (CR:75) on a proposal made the previous year by the Governor of Sinkiang which states, "with reference to Shahidulla which lies in southeast of the area under the jurisdiction of Ghuma Bazar country now belonging to Hotien Tao, it is a district which extends on the southern side to Kalahulumn Tapan, borders on British Tiaopaiti (i.e., Ladakh). On the Eastern side it extends Changchiliman Tapan of Hotien where there is also a small route leading to India" (CR:76). The Chinese officials have explained that Changchiliman is the same as Changling Burma near the Kongka Pass. Earlier, in 1921, a proposal was also made that Shahidulla be made a defence post. "Early in the middle of the 18th century" say the Chinese, they "started to set up 'Karens' at Shahidulla, Kengshwar and other places in control of the border areas" (CR:77) and "Chinese troops patrolled Aksai Chin, Linghithang and other places within the Chinese traditional customary line, where traces of the patrols can still be found up to the present time" (CR:77). In this connection they quote the message of Pan Chen, Commissioner of Hotien to the local authorities of Sinkiang, on May 23, 1898. "To the south west of Polu mountain, there is a road leading to Tiaopatti of Britain. This mountain road is rugged and has been severed and closed" (CR:77). The reference according to the Chinese is to the road through Aksai Chin.

In 1941 the Chinese lodged a complaint with the British Consul General of Kashgar that "in the area of Aksai Chin Lake which is under the border check-post of Kengshwar in Hotien, eleven Indians, upon crossing the border line without permission, were detained by

3 Despite clear geographical facts, the Chinese regard the last watershed area between the Karakoram mountains and the Kuen-Lun mountains as the being the Karakoram mountains.

the border check-post" (CR:79). They crossed "under the pretext of grazing sheep in order to steal salt and take it to India" (CR:79). They were allowed to go back although four of them were "sent by a special agency to cross the border line" (CR:79).

Finally, the Chinese furnished evidence of surveys carried out in the area. In 1891 Li Yuang-ping started from "the vicinity of the Kilik Pass in the west to the vicinity of the Kongka Pass in the east" (CR:81). He made an "extensive survey" "upon instructions received". "In brief this report of Li Yuang-ping deals with the fact that after crossing the Kuen-lun mountains he went from Haji Langar and Thaldat in a north-south direction, passing through 'earth gobi' in the Lingzi-thang area, to conduct surveys personally up to Chang-chiliman Tapan. These places are all situated in the vicinity of the traditional customary line maintained by the Chinese side" (CR:81).

In 1940 and 1941 the Sinkiang authorities "organised surveying teams to conduct, with the assistance of Soviet experts...including Aksai Chin, Lingzi-thang and the upper reaches of the Karakash river..." (CR:81-82) and in 1941 surveys "from Shahidulla through Kengshwar, Khitai, Tapan, Thaldat..." (CR:81-82).

From the end of 1950 to the autumn of 1951, as already stated, the Chinese forces entered Tibet from Sinkiang through Aksai Chin area, as claimed by the Chinese, and completed "the construction of the present Sinkiang-Tibet highway through the Aksai Chin area from March 1956 to October 1957" (CR:83).

PART II

We may now briefly recapitulate the comments of the Indian officials in their report on these Chinese claims. They pointed out that the identification of Tsung-ling mountains with the Karakoram mountains was incorrect and in fact Chinese maps showed that Tsung-ling mountains were the Kuen-lun. It would appear that the early maps reflected the vague understanding of the mountain system in the south of Sinkiang and do not justify the accurate identification of them with the Karakoram mountains. Even the source of the Qara Qash river was shown in the Chinese maps as being in the Kuen-lun mountains. The other term for Kuen-lun mountains was 'Nanshun' and 'Nimangyi', as pointed out with reference to the various Chinese works and maps quoted by them (Report of the Officials : 64-66).

The two modern maps produced by the Chinese officials were not acceptable to the Indian officials as "These maps were maps of a military organisation which had never been published. Secret maps are no evidence of boundary alignments" (Report of the Officials : 163). They also pointed out that "only since the 20th century that official Chinese maps began to vary the traditional alignment and to show large parts of Indian territory within China" (Report of the Officials : 163). Analysing these maps and the various alignments in them, the Indian side noted, "with such a bewildering variety of alignments...published in the course of a decade...one could not be certain as to what was the alignment claimed by China" (Report of the Officials : 163).

Regarding Turkic names of places in the disputed area, the Indians pointed out that the name Khotan was derived from Sanskrit 'Kushtane', "and in Aksai Chin all the major place names were Ladakhi; for example, Shinglung Donglung reveal a place where fire-wood and Wild Yaks were found; Pangong was a nullah (valley) with grassy ground; Kongka la meant a low pass; Amtogoe meant an encounter with a round object; Lanak la meant a black pass; Chang Chenmo meant the Great North and Lingzi-thang meant plains extending in all four directions" (Report of the Officials : 68).

With regard to Shahidulla, the Indian side pointed out, "all that the document of 1927 would have proved was that the new district would extend up to Changlung Barma pass which was not near the alignment claimed by China" (Report of the Officials : 155) and "no description had been given of the hundreds of square miles lying between Shahidulla and Kongka pass... Such a general statement that an area east of Shahidulla belonged to Khotan was no proof of the administration over a vast area south of it" (Report of the Officials : 154).

Shahidulla in fact is the place where the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir established an outpost in 1865 for protecting caravans between Leh and Yarkand. In 1892 when the Amban of Suket (Suket pass on the Kuen-lun mountains) established a pillar 64 miles south of Suket the Maharaja had reported it to the British. The establishment of an outpost at Shahidulla proved the inclusion of Aksai Chin within the Kashmir boundaries.

With regard to the surveys, the Indian side pointed out that the "description of the area surveyed by Lin Yuang-ping was in fact an illinformed account of a traveller... he could not have carried out a

scientific, let alone an official survey...the Chinese authorities had only reached the Kuen-lun mountains in 1892: it was over thirty years later, as the Chinese had themselves shown, that the Sinkiang authorities were even planning the establishment of an administrative centre at Shahidulla" (Report of the Officials : 156).

Regarding the 1940 and 1941 surveys, the documents provided by the Chinese side "dealt only with surveys carried out in 1940 on the Sino-Russian border. This was stated explicitly in the document itself...the list of places...mentioned no place in the Western Sector... and only the Russian Government were informed of these Operations" (Report of the Officials : 157). The Chinese produced "a photostat of a map said to have been the result of this survey. This map however appeared to be only an enlargement of a small scale map...in 1941 a Chinese Survey party had come to Kashmir and the Indian Government gave the Chinese party facilities to examine the Gilgit route" (Report of the Officials : 157).

The Indians also pointed out that no documentary evidence of Uighurs and Khirghiz of Sinkiang coming to Aksai Chin (as had been done by the Indian side in respect of such use of Aksai Chin by Ladakhis) had been provided. As for the arrest of 11 Ladakhis in 1941, the Indians said this had occurred in an area east of the Indian alignment. The claim by China that their army had passed through Aksai Chin in 1950 and thereafter built the road in 1957 was countered by saying, "Unlawful incursions could not create title to territory" (Report of the Officials : 161).

PART III

The existence of a route to Ladakh via the Polu mountains has been cited by China, as already reported, from a report of the Hotien Commissioner Pa-chen in 1898, as referring to the road through Aksai Chin. The Indian side pointed out that this was in fact an alternative route from Khoton to Rudok, and in an area which was to the east of the Indian alignment of boundary (Report of the Officials:159). This is at variance with the Chinese claim of Aksai Chin providing the only viable route to China connecting Sinkiang with Tibet. The route to Tibet from Sinkiang (Khotan) to Rudok in western Tibet lies also through Keriya. In fact in 1956 when Basil Davidson had inquired he was told that the route from Khotan via Keriya to Tibet

was under construction⁴. The first mention of the Aksai Chin route relates to an expedition of Dzungar Mongols from Northern Turkestan in 1717. As narrated by L. Petech⁵ the Chinese were exercising control over Tibet through Lha-bzan Khan the Qosot Mongol chief. A force of 6000 marched from Khotan under the brother of the Dzungar king in December 1716-January 1717. They travelled "over a most difficult route which was later reopened for traffic with Chinese Turkestan by the emperor Chien-lung". The force skirted Mna-ris and arrived suddenly in Nag-tsari, to the west and north west of Tengri-nor. In November 1717 they took Lhasa. This route was used only in emergency and was more difficult than the Keriya route. In 1924 a Qosot prince took flight from Lhasa crossing the frontier of Tibet at Keriya-Kotal pass as the easier route.

Later an Indian officer of the Survey Department Kishan Singh, a member of Forsyth's Mission to Yakub Beg, had found his way back to India along this alternate route via Polu. "It ran from One and half to two degrees to the east of the most easternly route namely, that which W. H. Johnson discovered in his journey to Khotan" (quoted in Dorothy Woodmans 'Himalayan Frontiers'). In 1885 the officially backed Carey Mission used this route. Carey found Kishan Singh's observations regarding the route so accurate he could use them as an informed guide. He followed it along the eastern side of Aksai Chin and when he arrived at Keriya—"The existence of this route, was entirely unknown to the Chinese authorities at Keriya".⁶

The case of China that the Aksai Chin route is a vital life line for them does not seem to be borne out. Nor is their assertion that the construction of this road was a major engineering feat. In fact, the surface here is hard and level and apart from placing signs and marks nothing much in the way of engineering skill would have been involved.

The Chinese case regarding possession or legal right over Aksai Chin and the regions to the west of it in Ladakh which they now claim by way of right has not been substantiated by any conclusive evidence. The meagre evidence they produced has been attacked as flawed and even 'manufactured' as in the case of the surveys jointly conducted with the Russians in 1940 in the disputed area. The Chinese case for claiming Aksai Chin can hardly convince any outside observer.

4 Davidson, Basil., *Turkestan Alive*, London, 1957.

He was the first journalist to visit Sinkiang after the Communist take over.

5 Petech, L., *China and Tibet in the early 18th century*, 1950.

6 In: *Proceedings of the RGS*, Vol. 9, 1887.

Why Infantry Career is not Attractive Enough?

COL O P KHANNA

INTRODUCTION

FOR the last two decades or so, it has been observed that Infantry is not as popular as other Arms and Services have become over the years. The cadets from the Indian Military Academy opt less and less for the Infantry and the Artillery and more and more for the Services. The die-hard Infantryer will obviously say that there is something wrong and the Infantry career must be made attractive enough so that more and more cadets opt for the Infantry and Artillery than is the case now. This problem is of recent origin as prior to mid-sixties, the optees for the Infantry from the cadets qualifying from Indian Military Academy used to be many times more than the vacancies available and there used to be a great deal of competition amongst the candidates to get their choice of Infantry or Artillery. Incidentally at that time, no Indian Military Academy graduate used to opt for the Services like Army Service Corps or Army Ordnance Corps. In actual fact in the history of the Indian Military Academy, it was for the first time that in 1957 four cadets opted for the Army Service Corps and out of these four, two had Army Service Corps as the second or a third choice. Pressures used to be brought to bear on the authorities concerned in terms of family claims on a particular regiment etc so that the Indian Military Academy graduates could get the regiment of their choice. Average number of optees per 100 vacancies for the period 1966-70 and 1979-83 for the Army Service Corps, Artillery, Infantry and Army Ordnance Corps is given below:—

Ser	Years	Armoured	Artillery	Infantry	ASC	AOC	Remarks
(a)	1966-70	164%	85%	79%	114%	159%	Optees for Mechanised
(b)	1979-83	187%	56%	63%	217%	350%	Infantry were 180%

Prior to 1966, the option rate for Infantry and Artillery used to be more than 100%.

Obviously, it now indicates that whereas Infantry attraction has lost from 79 to 63 percent and Artillery from 85 to 65 percent, the attractiveness of the Services like Army Ordnance Corps has increased by almost 100 percent.

PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM

Most of our senior generals belong to the Infantry for it is the pre-ponderant Corps of the Army. It is the queen of battle. However, it is observed that the perception of this problem is topsy-turvy and lacking in reality. Unfortunately, invariably it has been heard and said so often by our senior officers that this lack of attraction for the Infantry in the minds of young cadets is due to the reasons of difficult living conditions and less pay and perks. If this would have been the sole cause of the loss of attraction for the Infantry career, it should have been equally applicable to other arms and services/para Military Forces who have to counter similar hard conditions of living same pay and perks. Probably, Signals have to work harder, yet this problem of not finding sufficient optees for the Infantry is not there in that service. It has also been alleged that the life in Infantry is difficult. Infantry, perforce has to be posted at field areas in remote corners of India and also in most unhygienic and uncongenial climatic conditions. Also, it being a non-technical Service, it does not get the advantages of the Technical Service, in terms of qualification pay etc. It has also been alleged that the life in the Infantry is risky. It suffers more in casualties in times of war. Voluntary retirements have grown from 84 in 1975 to 295 in 1983, which tells the story of the disenchantment of the Infantry life. However, this was not the situation about two decades ago when voluntary retirement was a rare phenomenon. If risk and casualty rate is the cause of dis-satisfaction then the flying branch of the Air Force would not get any candidates, where the risk to life is greater, but there is no dearth for such volunteers for the Air Force whereas, hardly anybody wants to volunteer for the Infantry.

The real cause of the problem does not lie in the above factors as perceived by our leadership. The above factors are not very relevant to the problem, whereas the core of the problem, to a large extent, concerns with the quality of life in the Infantry, which is deteriorating day by day and year by year. It is strange that our

leadership has not been able to put its finger at the right spot rather than shuffling the problem and giving most unrelated causes of the genuineness of the above problem.

THE SATISFACTION/DIS-SATISFACTION CONTINUUM

Basically, the dis-enchantment with the Infantry career and not getting sufficient volunteers for the life revolves around the problem of sufficient and justifiable motivation for the Indian Military Academy graduates. It will be pertinent to bring out the experiments carried out by one psychologist, Mr Herzberg, on the basics of motivation. Incidentally, the statistics collected by the above psychologist related to a number of army officers of the American Army besides others in the managerial cadre in the trade and industry and other services like universities and colleges. It was very strange that the above experiment revealed some very pertinent facts. One such fact that came to light was that every job has two types of factors related to it. Firstly, it is the job content factors, which include type of job, its contents, satisfaction, innovativeness, recognition etc that the job gives. The other set of factors related to job is known as job context factors. In other words, those factors which are generally not in the job itself, but are at its periphery and affect the job from outside. Such factors are pay and perks, working conditions, amount of light and warmth, accommodation, schooling facilities etc. It was also found that when a person did not like a job, it was the job context factors that he blamed. The person leaving a job will always tell you that either the job did not pay him well or it did not give him good perks or the working conditions were awful. In other words the dis-satisfaction with the job relates to the job context factors and not to the job content factors. On the other side, when somebody likes a particular job and if he is asked the reasons for the same, he is apt to reply in terms of the job content factors and not job context factor. When a person likes a job, he likes it because the job gives him satisfaction. It gives him status. It makes him great. His work is recognised. He will never say that he likes the job because it gives him returns in terms of money, pay and perks etc. When a person likes a job he likes it because the job is difficult, glamorous and the job is challenging etc and not because the job gives him too much of money or too much of pay. In other words, the satisfaction with the job is because of certain factors, the absence of which will not cause dis-satisfaction. Similarly, dis-satisfaction with the job arises because of the factors the presence of which are not going to affect the satisfaction of the job. Thus, it will be seen

that the satisfaction and dis-satisfaction are not the ends of the same continuum. The job context factors are known in the present day as the hygiene factors and the job content factors are similarly known as the motivators. Whereas the motivators can and do motivate people, the hygiene factors are nothing but a platform from which the motivators can take off. Motivators cannot function without the hygiene factors because the hygiene factors have made the ground from where motivators can take off and hygiene factors in the absence of motivators also cannot motivate. In other words, to make any job attractive, it is necessary that it must have reasonable hygiene factors involved. It is also necessary that after the reasonable hygiene factors, the motivators should be made to act upon. It is the contention of the writer that whereas we have a good and reasonable degree of hygiene factors in the infantry career, we have no motivators and that is precisely where the perception of our leadership in tackling this problem has gone wrong. All these twenty years, our leadership has only been emphasising on the hygiene factors and doing nothing about the motivators. In actual fact whatever motivation we had twenty years back, has been disregarded and today life in Infantry and Artillery has become so much worse because of lack of these motivators. Surprisingly, meanwhile the Services have enriched their job content in the same period and that is why one finds life in Services as more enchanting and attractive for the cadets of the Indian Military Academy. After all the pay packet of all officers whether they are from Infantry or Artillery or Ordnance Corps, is more or less the same, yet least number of cadets want to go for Infantry, and there is no dearth for volunteers for the Ordnance Corps. We still continue to fight with the Government on authorisation of combat pay in the Infantry and Artillery and the Armd Corps at the cost of the technical pay for the other Arms and Services, but our leadership does not realise that this paltry sum is going to make no difference to the quality of life in the Infantry. It took four years for working out the methodology and framing rules for claiming the technical pay by the Army Headquarters. The delay was in actual fact being caused by the Adjutant General's Branch because it wanted to make the authorisation of combat pay conditional on the authorisation of the technical pay.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES

There is no denying the fact that there is greater risk of loss of life or limbs in Infantry than in other Services, but that by itself cannot be a factor for dis-enchantment of the Indian Military Academy

graduates with the Infantry life. The man lives by activity and more interesting is the activity that you can make, he will respond to it and will like it. The man will get motivated by the job which is interesting and also which is risky and challenging. It will be pertinent to point out that a study carried out by the psychologists brought out that fighter pilot's job is still the first choice of Air Force cadets. Comparing aviation to the Infantry, there are more accidents and loss of life in Fighter Branch of the Air Force than in the Infantry. There is more risk and yet there is no dearth of volunteers for the aviation Branch and at the same time we find that there is hardly any optee for the Infantry, known as the queen of the battle. Therefore to say that there are less volunteers for the Infantry because it is risky, will be a misnomer. The study of attitudes and interests of American Air Force crews showed that most men prefer flying, or navigation in the air to ground duties. This is despite the fact the men knew the danger and were aware of the hard work and gruelling strain which the aviation imposes and yet there is no dearth of volunteers for such a job, whereas the poor Infantry finds few. Obviously, if we have to find the reasons for this, then it is not the risk factors that influence the choice of the prospective candidate, but it is the job content and job satisfaction that you can derive from the work done as an aviator in the Air Force or as an individual man in the battle.

If it is the question of pay and perks, most of the Army officers of various Corps including Infantry are drawing almost the same pay and enjoy more or less the same perks. However, the promotions in the Infantry are quicker, though they depend upon the whims and fancies of their superiors. This should be a positive point for the infantry career, but we do find that despite the above, Infantry career, is the least popular. Not only in Infantry the promotions are quicker, but at later stages of promotions, the Infantry man commands an all Arms and Services team. Another argument may be given that the living conditions of the individual are nomadic. They live in pickets. The family life is non-existent. They have to do more tenures in field areas where the family accommodation is generally not available. This, by itself, is not a sufficient cause for the demoralisation and demotivation because the officers of the Army Service Corps engaged in transport units live most of the time on roads and transit camps. They ply their vehicles mostly in high altitude areas. For them the family life is also non-existent because they can, at the maximum, be with their families for once in ten days or so and yet you find that for such a life the attractiveness has increased by 100 percent whereas for

the similar Infantry life it has generated a dis-enchantment to the extent of almost 30 percent. Take the case of other Arms and Services like Engineers, Signals etc. Where-ever the Infantry man lives, a similar proportion of the officers of the above Arms also live side by side for Infantry does require the services of their brethren in other Arms. Yet, you do not find dis-enchantment in other cadres.

CAUSES OF DE-MOTIVATION

As has been explained earlier, if you ask for the reasons for the dis-satisfaction of a job, naturally the answer would be in the realm of hygiene factors, but in actual fact the de-motivation is invariably due to the lack of motivators. When the officers of the Army Services Corps, Army Ordnance Corps draw almost the same pay, the same perks and living conditions are more or less the same as compared to the Infantry, it will be obvious that the dis-enchantment with the Infantry career does not lie in the job context factors, i.e. the hygiene factors, but, it lies in the motivators for they are the ones which are either lacking or are non-existent. Even if the pay and perks of Infantry officers are doubled, it is still not going to motivate unless the quality of life is improved in the Infantry. The job context factors at the maximum make the ground fertile where the motivators then can bloom. The life in the Infantry has to be made meaningful and rich and enchanting so that it is attractive enough for the talent to opt for.

Over the years, the culture of the Infantry has deteriorated down to a degree where one though forming part of it feels that one does not belong to it. It is the culture of alienation. In a study carried out by the Institute of Defence Management over the subject of the most important values in the culture of the Army life brought out the fact that what Infantry officers cherish most is an upright life and initiative. Obviously, it points to the fact that the officers in the Infantry are being over-supervised and therefore they feel that the initiative is the quantity for which they should work for. Also they want to live an upright life because of the fact that they, in the daily life, face a great deal of unnecessary politics which they can cherish the least. In another study carried out, it was quite evident from statistics available that 48 percent of the officers indicated that their aspirations were not fulfilled and major causes of frustration were discrimination by senior officers (19.81 percent), incompetence of seniors/poor leadership (17.86 percent), supersession (9.39 percent), lack of opportunities (9.89 percent) and sychophancy (7.24 percent). The same sample of

officers also indicated the constraints and limitations of the Army life and the major constraints and limitations were lack of opportunities (11.95 percent), poor career planning (8.81 percent), lack of integrity in seniors (7.68 percent), lack of recognition (6.39 percent) and fads of seniors (5.43 percent). Incidentally, these were the top most causes both for constraints and limitations as also causes of frustration. This sample survey tells its own story.

The culture of the Infantry life can best be described by the following simple saying prevalent in the Army :—

“An Infantry officer has a lot of Izzat, but he is being bullied all the time. He is paid well, but he has no money in his pocket. He is a very busy man, but he does not know what he is doing”.

Expanding upon the above theme, it will be relevant to point out that an individual officer's life is exactly what the above three sentences portray it to be. In the culture of the Infantry life, the officer is very busy without doing anything. If after a day's work, you ask an Infantry officer as to what he has done, he is apt to reply after a great deal of introspection that he has done nothing and achieved nothing. Such is the life of an Infantry officer that he is over busy in the mundane things of life. It gives him no satisfaction and once the satisfaction is not there, obviously the individual motivation cannot exist.

It is a matter of fact that in the history of the Army career, no soldier or an officer has ever been paid well enough to lead a life of luxury. In the history of the Army career, one would find that the officers were mostly recruited from the blue-blooded nobles, who would supplement their pay with the income from their private sources. It was only in the last century or so that the pay scales were brought to a reasonable level where a middle class life could be ensured for the officers. Even then the Army of the nineteenth century is replete with examples where Captains and Lieutenants had to borrow money from the regimental banyas to keep a standard of life appropriate to the rank. It was in the twentieth century that the Army officers started getting a reasonable amount of pay to ensure a middle class life. An Army officer to-day whether he belongs to Infantry or other Corps or Services, is paid reasonably well, yet in the Infantry he finds that most of his money goes on extravagant customs and traditions of life and that he is left with hardly anything. Obviously, the pay that provides security is lacking.

Army should provide very honourable life and people should join it not for the sake of money, but for the sake of izzat. Till as late as First World War, a soldier was never paid more than a shilling a week, but still there were hordes of them who would willingly join the army career. Similarly, in Infantry of the years gone by, it was an honourable life without sprinkling of the promotion mania and ancillary drawbacks. To-day, in an Infantry Battalion the conversation revolves around as to who is the blue eyed boy of whom. In an Infantry Battalion, intentionally or otherwise, the officers are classified into 'Good' or 'Not so good' by the Commanding Officers. There out of five majors only one is to succeed to next rank. Obviously, he can so succeed at the cost of the remaining four majors. It is a cut throat competition where the men who succeed have to tread on the toes of others. No doubt competition within limits is good, but cut throat competition fosters an-every-man-for-himself spirit that is fatal to esprit de corps. There is no greater motivation than success, but such success at the cost of others who lose much more often lowers their motivation. Ruthless competition can degenerate into demotivation for the many who lose. This is precisely what we are seeing in the Infantry life. If it is to be treated as a career, it has to provide a sufficient success rate for those who aspire to go up, but what we see at every level, from Majors to Lt Colonels and Lt Colonels to Colonels etc., is that more than 60% of the officers are thrown on the way side having been denied any further prospects of promotion. Obviously, it demotivates that 60% of the officers. Therefore, the Infantry career which promises you more failures than success at each level cannot be an enchanting career.

To-day the Infantry life for an officer is so busy that he just does not know where his time goes. Whether it is a ceremonial parade to be conducted for the Army Day or the trenches to be dug for the exercise or for that matter it is fighting the terrorists, building the bashas, the man is busy. No doubt that it is the activity which makes the life more interesting rather than sloth, yet activity of routine nature without any innovativeness and originality does not bring out the best in man and that is where the Infantry career stands to lose. Most probably, this is due to the fact that the Junior Commissioned Officers of the Infantry are being utilised less and less for the routine duties. It is because of the fact that they are being given lesser and lesser responsibility and more and more accountability is being thrown on the officer class as such. Again this is due to the cult of a no mistake army where a mistake may mean the cost of promotion. Obviously, under these circumstances, the officer class feels itself

stiffled. In the culture where the accountability lies on your head for the actions of others, the motivation cannot stay put.

Another aspect which requires a great deal of consideration is the job recognition. Possibly it is in the culture of our society itself from which the values have been borrowed by the culture of the Infantry life. More so possibly, it is due to the culture of no mistake army again that we tend to upbraid every one for all the mistakes that he has committed, but we tend to be very spare in giving the due recognition to a man for doing a commendable work. We tend to take it for granted that commendable work is a routine expectation from a man and a mistake committed is an offence. It is a very wrong over-view of the cultural ethos. Twenty to thirty years back, it was the Captains and Majors who took the decisions and they do so in actual battle too. To-day, they are denied this authority. Even to detail a man on some outside work, Commanding Officer's permission is a must. Recognition is rarely given and where recognition is not given, you cannot develop a subordinate. It is an oft-repeated principle of military organisation that one can achieve anything only by developing ones subordinates. In the ultimate analysis of the Army organisation, it is the man that matters and therefore, the human resources development is of prime importance. You can only become great when the shoulders of your subordinates are higher. In the culture of the Infantry life too, this has been perverted a great deal because every man and every officer tends to feel and feel for himself. Obviously, in such circumstances neither the cultural values of the life can be developed nor a brotherhood based on the code of honour can be established.

If any organisation requires honour to be its ultimate virtue, it is the army organisation. A man gives up his life not for the patriotism nor for his village, but he gives up his life for the honour of himself and his unit. Unfortunately, in the Infantry life today, honour means nothing for it has become a dishonourable race for the officers to come up by doing down others. Advancement in life is a very necessary adjunct on which the stability of the organisation depends. Unfortunately, our rejection rate is so high that only a miniscule succeeds and majority fails. What happens then is that there is nothing much that can be expected out of the organisation towards its enchantment. Today, officers have no time even to pursue their hobbies, if any, because they are involved so deeply with the routine jobs where the enchantment cannot be there. Job recognition is lacking. Subordinate development is not there. Quality of life has deteriorated. Advancement and growth are woefully lacking.

from background factors like supervision, work conditions, relationship with superiors and peers, salary, status, security and personal life. Removal of work context factors as stated above will not result in motivation and job satisfaction. No doubt, the hygiene factors are important and there should be sufficient security, pay & perks, status and working conditions etc but merely giving more and more of such facilities is not going to make the job interesting or make the men satisfied. For job satisfaction and motivation, it is the other set of factors like achievement, recognition, work responsibility, advancement and growth, which will have to be tackled and made more challenging and interesting to produce job satisfaction. As it is in the present circumstances, we have achieved a reasonable level of hygiene factors and they are more or less the same for each and every Corps and Branch of Army, yet we lag behind in the field of motivation like nature of work and job satisfaction and fellow feeling where some other Corps and Branches of the Army have taken the lead over Infantry and thus have more elan and elite and aura of challenge about their jobs than what Infantry has to give at the present. It is this that causes talent to opt more and more for the Corps and Branches where the job is more challenging than for the Infantry. If Infantry wants to attract more and more Indian Military Academy graduates, obviously, it has to tackle the motivators like job satisfaction, advancement and growth and responsibility etc. Only then it, in truest sense, will become the queen of battle. No amount of combat pay and other allowances etc are going to achieve the aura of respectability for the Infantry and its enchantment for the cadets of the Indian Military Academy.

The Chief's Letter—A Return to Traditional Values

BRIG N B GRANT (RETD)

SINCE the last two decades, industrial development in the country, has taken an exponential jump, creating in its wake a large potential, not only for new jobs, but for better jobs with enhanced pay packets and a quality of life, the likes of which was never experienced in India, except by the old ICS and the covenanted ranks of British industry. In this respect, the Army (a generic term to connote the military) found itself lagging behind considerably, but could do nothing about it, except grumble. However, this resulted in a drastic lowering of standards of intake in the officer rank, and a feeling of despondency in the serving officer's cadre at all levels. Something had to be done to put this right,—thus the advent of the first cadre review. This however, did not produce any substantial improvements, necessitating a second cadre review, followed by a major revision of the army pay structure. Things suddenly looked brighter for the soldier, who had never had it so good ever.

In the process however, the emphasis began to shift from the traditional military values of Chetwood's days, to that of intense careerism, and advancement of rank at all levels, which today seems to have become the highest value for a large number of officers. This was to be expected, and under the circumstances, we cannot find fault with it. However, the change has also resulted in a series of moral and ethical failures represented by officers acquiescing in, initiating, or participating in policies and actions, which although individually perhaps they regarded as unethical, but ones which are followed nevertheless as the way to career advancement.

It now seems clear that, the exaggerated emphasis upon careerism to the point of acquiescing in almost every policy without opposition, could only have happened in a military structure which has, over the years, consistently failed to develop an ethical doctrine of resistance. The present Chief's letter of 1 Feb 86, is a clarion call for the officer

corps, to return to the traditional values of the 'way of a soldier'. After the Vietnam conflict, Gen Westmoreland, the then Chief of Staff US Army, had ordered such a study to be carried out. In India however, this is the first time that this kind of self examination has been initiated by an Army Chief. To quote him, "we should, therefore, look at ourselves first and be not only frank but hyper-critical".

The loss of traditional military values seem closely connected to the transformation of the army from a cohesive corporate structure into a largely careerist business type one. If, as the Chief desires, the officer corps is to return to its traditional role of contributing to cohesion, then there must be a change of values away from those rooted in the kind of business ethos, to those typical of a quasimonastic institution. The main difference between the two is that, whereas the business type structure stresses the ethics of self interest intended to stimulate individual advancement and initiative, the cohesive structure develops operating procedures and norms, that are valued for themselves; e.g., honour codes, medals, citations etc, which to quote the Chief, "are becoming unfashionable".

There is also another difference. Cohesive structures rely much more heavily upon 'higher code' justifications for developing organisational norms and compelling individual behaviour; this would be regarded by the business type structure as highly counter productive, in that, material self interest is not served. There is a school of thought which maintains that, the ideal would be to have a mixture of both structures. The argument being that, the development of modern technology requires the adoption of modern business mechanisms of management for its success. History however shows that this is not correct. If one looks back, for its time, the German army was, and the Israeli army still is, a marvel of technology, and yet maintained high levels of ethics and group cohesion, and had no need for a business type structure to support it. Technology per se compels nothing—certainly it is not an impetus to ape the modern business confirmation. To quote the Chief, "while in the narrow sense, professional competence has been going up at all levels, the officer corps has lost much of its self esteem, pride and elan; it is becoming increasingly opportunist and sycophantic".

The problem is, how does one get an institution like the army to accept new values, or adjust old ones in order to achieve what is seen as a desirable form of behaviour? The specific question is, how to reconvert the officer corps to the traditional values, when, at the

outset, they have been conditioned to the fact that, the very success of their careers depends on their ability to conform to the existing norms of behaviour?

To begin with, amongst the most important variables in the value-change process, is the extent of formal and forceful support which must be forthcoming from the highest levels of command. Failure to do so will result in the lower ranks being unclear as to what behaviour their superior expects. It is also important that, officers charged with initiating and overseeing the transmission of these values, must believe in, and share such values, and support them publicly. Those who do not do so, must be removed and replaced with those whose position is predicated upon such support. A hard task, but one which must be done.

Secondly, strong ethical indoctrination programmes must be instituted at all levels, but which must be particularly strong at the entrance levels of our NDA and IMA. Ultimately, it is only the young officers who can be expected to carry the new values throughout their careers, and to eventually internalize them, so that they become part of their personal and organizational codes. The key point, however, is that the indoctrination of junior officers at the entrance level, will place automatic limits upon the behaviour of senior officers, who are then less likely to violate the code because of serious risks of exposure. Thirdly, enforcement of the new values must also consistently demonstrate to the members of the officer corps, that such values and their concomitant behaviour, will strengthen communal and integrative links with one's peers and superiors.

Fourthly, it must be remembered that, society in all countries, has always imbued the soldier with sterling qualities of character, such as, integrity, loyalty, courage and self-sacrifice. In this respect, even in India, the position right upto Independence and perhaps two decades later, had been that, although some lapses of character may be accepted amongst civilians, they could never be forgiven in a soldier. On the face of it, this does not sound logical, nevertheless, if a soldier has to fight, and in the process he is willing to die, he must have these characteristics ingrained in him, so as to make him feel morally superior to his civilian counterpart. In the past this was achieved by insulating the soldier in cantonments, wherein he grew with a set of values different from the rest of the populous. Now that cantonments exist in name only, the problem of projecting a morally superior image of the soldier to the civil population becomes extremely difficult.

Thus new values are more likely to take root within the army, if strong external support for them can be brought to bear, as it once was. Perhaps, if continuous projection of the various aspects of a soldier's life is made a routine in the news media and TV, as is being done in the UK and the USA, it would go a long way to bring this about. However, even here, one must remember that, a civilian will only respect a soldier, if the latter respects himself. For instance, as it happens today, where even in places of purely social intercourse, like an officers club dance, or at RSI Cinema shows, seats are reserved rank wise, and where a senior officer refuses to mix and thinks it below his dignity to sit in the same row as his junior, one can't expect the civilian to treat him otherwise. To quote the Chief, "we cannot afford to have a caste-system within the officer corps".

Fifthly, the change will not take place, unless the new values are seen as essential to a successful career. Official support in terms of rewards and punishments must be consistent with the new values, failing which they will gradually become weakend and fade away. Once the individual officer is convinced that the values he is expected to maintain are supported by the army heirarchy, and are shared and observed by his peers and superiors, he will begin to identify himself with those values and codes as the 'mark of an officer'. To bring this about, it would be necessary to recast the existing appraisal system and modify the CR format, which from now onwards, should clearly reflect the new values as of primary importance for advancement. The CR must clearly reflect that, moral integrity is at the centre of a leader's effectiveness, as compromise of one's moral standards can never be truly hidden from one's brother officers, or, indeed, in most instances, from the men in his command. The notion must sink in that, there are just some things that are not done, and that there is a line beyond which a truly ethical officer will not go. Accordingly, the notion that 'one has to go along to get along' has to be rejected as the first step to greater compromises of one's integrity. The central theme in the Chief's letter maintains that, to be an officer, is to occupy a 'special position of moral trust', and that this trust—which clearly goes hand in glove with personal integrity—must never be violated. The new CR must clearly reflect, that, if there are circumstances in which this trust is violated, career advancement is never to be among them.

Lastly, there comes a moment in the career of every officer, when the choice has to be made between pleasing one's superiors, and staying loyal to oneself and one's values. At times, the rewards for betraying one's values are great, indeed being too often reflected in

promotion or other gains. To quote the Chief's letter, "I am very concerned about increasing sycophancy towards seniors, which unless checked will corrode the entire system; much of this, I realise is due to the pernicious system of recompense and financial advancement being totally linked to higher ranks". However, for this to be really effective, not only the CRs must be completely modified, but what is even more important, it must be shown and discussed with the officer reported upon, as it once was, but which is taboo today. This will not only infuse trust in the junior officer, but will simultaneously strengthen the moral fibre of his senior to report what he thinks must be said. If the CR is not shown, it will weaken and discourage in the senior officer the very leadership qualities of 'back bone and guts' which the Chief's letter speaks about. Of all the other disadvantages resulting in not showing the CRs, this would be its biggest failure.

To conclude, in my living memory, the Chief's 1 Feb letter is one of the most pragmatic documents on military values, ever written, without platitudes and with no holds barred. He wants to bring back to the Indian army, the British sense of 'the military way' and the French sense of 'elan' qualities that escape definition but quite clearly exist and affect the behaviour of their respective armies. That a similar aura, that once was, but is fast disappearing in the Indian army in general and the officer corps in particular, has been the major thrust of his letter.

The letter is dynamic, and is a mandate for action at all levels. Unfortunately, todate, there does not appear to be any visible signs that its contents have been implemented, leave alone in units, but even at the next levels of command. To my mind, this is even more damaging than if there was no mandate at all; but having given one, a point of no-return has been reached, and if not gone through, will tantamount to an aborted take off, which could be catastrophic. One can always argue that, an important factor in the process is, time, and that transformation of an organisation's values is a slow process, thus, it is unrealistic to expect new values to take hold immediately. On the other hand, any delay in its implementation will be taken as a lack of will to change existing practices, many of which, with time, will be further entrenched to the point of being fossilized. Clearly the time for cosmetic reforms are over, and they wont work. What is required is, the will to enforce the new code of honour at all levels of command immediately. Time is running out; the transformation, if it has to come about, must be completed before the present Chief's tenure of office is completed. The army may not get another chance again.

Need for Restructuring the Pre-Commission Training in the Army

BRIG S S CHANDEL, SC, VSM

INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY

TILL one investigates in detail, NDA, the country's renowned Defence Academy, seems to convey an impression of a bold new concept where-by our elite of the armed forces are being honed and chiselled into becoming the most competent combat leaders with unique tri-Service perspective. This would make for deep understanding of one another and frictionless functioning of our war machine. Not only that. These officers would be intellectually fully updated with broad based knowledge of humanities and a thorough knowledge of modern science. That's not the end yet. The officer cadets are exposed to variegated cultural rainbow of the country. That would seem to be a dream come true.

Alas, the reality is quite different. We seemed to have evolved an institution where the main theme song is a BA/BSc degree. Seventy per cent of the cadets' time and an expenditure of Rs two lakhs per capita is spent to provide a merely graduate of inane intellectual accomplishments which we could obtain at no cost from our 127 odd graduate manufacturing universities in the country. The remaining 30 percent of the time is devoted mainly to physical training and drill which would be acceptable but not in the intensity and degree with which they are pursued. The core service subjects in the case of an Army cadet get a measly 9 per cent of the instructional cake.

What of the tri-service dimension? It is covered in two percent of the total periods.

It is hard to think of a greater travesty of what could be a majestic concept. And the fact that no other major country has gone in for the concept may be a pointer toward lesser cost effectiveness of the idea.

INDIAN MILITARY ACADEMY

The IMA is more professionally oriented and manages to produce an officer at a per capita cost of Rs. 75 lakhs. However even here the totally unnecessary coverage of academic subjects is continued. Everyone is a graduate. Yet 23 percent of the time available is devoted to academics covering a trivia of subjects with indifferent quality of instructions. Once again, the excessive emphasis on drill and PT (over 500 periods ie 31 percent of the service subjects) seems to make the development of officers somewhat less professional, than what would seem desirable.

AIM—A DISCUSSION

It is proposed, in this paper, to examine the pattern and syllabi of our pre-commission training at the NDA and IMA with a view to determine their effectiveness in producing competent combat leaders. This aim of training in NDA/IMA is to produce a competent combat leader. What the country expects from its armed forces officers which it trains at NDA/IMA is an effective and competent leadership in combat situation at junior level namely platoon and company. Alongside, it should also laydown the foundations for higher leadership in battle. The point is that the effort involved in imparting higher and broader knowledge of the varieties of scientific disciplines and humanities than what the cadets who have joined NDA and IMA after 11th class, Intermediate or graduation, already have, seriously detracts from the basic aim of the officer training institution. In the hope of producing a well rounded gentleman soldiers, who in due course, will become a scholar soldier, we only succeed in substantially diluting the soldierly aspects. This happens with smooth insidiousness. For, the white collar nature of work is always less physically strenuous and dangerous. And if side, by side it also secures for you a higher place in passing out order, so much greater the attraction. However the young officer who passes out of the portals of these military institutions is yet a green horn who will not be equipped to lead his men in combat even though he may be willing to die.

Therefore it shall be my endeavour in this article to examine the relevance and effectiveness of the syllabi of NDA, IMA vis-a-vis their ultimate aim and suggest another pattern of structuring of instruction at these institutions.

BACK GROUND—HOW IT CAME TO HAPPEN

Before we do that it will be of interest to analyse the various pulls and pressures which have brought into being the existing pattern of instruction in these institutions. It has been an inevitable off-shoot of the development of a sophisticated industrial society. A significant development in the post second World War era has been the infiltration, nay, invasion of management experts, academicians and technologists in the organisation, equipping, training and occasionally even in the conduct of war. To an extent they have valid roles. The combatant has to be provided competitive technology and comprehensive managerial support to enable him to take to the field and then endure there. Even the general staff work is but merely another name for front tier management. The front tier managers ie, the officers manning general staff need to be aware of and sensitive to the interface, linkage and inter dependence, between the battlefield and the cabinet halls; and the fields, factories, mines etc; equally the pulls and pressures of diplomacy to be able to gauge and react astutely to keep the requisite strategic equilibrium. Thus the point of view that an officer of a modern Army should be widely exposed to all these aspects and disciplines would appear to be very persuasive—apparently.

Apparently, because a deeper and more honest analysis would reveal ulterior motives in the skein. The warfare ultimately must boil down to combat and to the possibility of loss of life and limb, drudgery and privations, which can be only borne by fortitude created out of training for such an eventuality and an environment which everyone shares and where he is ranked according to common denominators namely valour and skill in battle. All history of warfare bears witness to this observation. Industrially and managerially sophisticated Americans were worsted by what would appear to be ill-equipped and unrefined North Vietnamese in the sixties and by the Chinese in the fifties. Some of the best fighting soldiers in the second World War were technologically unsophisticated Japanese, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Indians and Gurkhas. That refrain can be traced back to the unsophisticated Mongols conquering much of the sophisticated world; to the savage Huns keeping the world

cowering without a scrap of paper to assist them; to the uneducated tribes of Arabia carrying the flag of Islam to the sophisticated nations of Asia and Europe; to the rustic Macedonians of Philip trouncing the sophisticated Greeks; the not so sophisticated levies of Alexander laying flat the sophisticated Persians; to the not so civilised carthaginians of Hannibal terrorising the sophisticated Romans for a generation.

THE ULTERIOR MOTIVE

We referred a moment ago to 'ulterior motive' in propounding and stressing in technological, managerial and social studies. This needs to be explained. This new culture has been brought about by the worldly wise who would like to have best of both the worlds. Have the glory of the soldier's uniform, and safety, power and comfort of an industrial executive. How else to obtain it except by selling the new approach as the surefire formula to success in war. The central theme is to emphasise WAR and its technological and managerial complexity and gloss over COMBAT. This latter is depicted as a minor issue which can be taken care of by menials. They tend to forget or deliberately ignore Clausewitz.

Clausewitz held that war was neither a scientific game nor an international sport, but an act of violence. In the nature of war there is nothing moderate or philanthropic as such. That science can neither moderate nor "ennoble" war, an opinion which in an unexpected sense has proved to be only too correct. In Clausewitz's view the scientific part of warfare, that is the one that can be measured and rationalized, is only of secondary importance. Substance is a victorious¹ battle.

The syllabi of our Academics ignores this basic philosophy.

THE EXISTING PATTERN OF INSTRUCTION

In the existing pattern of our syllabi, at NDA, ACC and IMA, the weightages allotted to the academic and service subjects are tabulated below :—

<i>Institution</i>	<i>Academic</i>		<i>Service subjects</i>	
	<i>Periods</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Periods</i>	<i>%</i>
NDA	3213	67%	1061	33%
EX NDA	309	23%	1343	77%
Cadet at IMA				
IMA	577	30%	1901	70%
(Regular courses)				
Direct Entry				

¹ Clausewitz by Rotfels

ANALYSIS OF THE SYLLABI

However, merely the coverage does not tell the whole story. That comes out more clearly when one analyses the detailed syllabi which suffers from the following defects.

UNWIELDY COVERAGE

In their zeal to expose the Officer Cadet to many disciplines and sophistications, the cadet is given a homeopathic dosages of everything. He is made to study English literature, Hindi, foreign languages, History of the world and our own, modern Geography, Political Science and Economics. There are similarly long list of topics to be covered in the science stream. There is need for this syllabi to be re-evaluated vis-a-vis its usefulness to the ultimate job requirement of an officer by a joint body of experts composed of Army Officers of the affected seniority, say Captains of upto 6 years of service and educationists ex-NCERT. This could be presided by a senior officer who could give further directions as to the future career/job requirements to the younger group of officers and the civilian experts. We will do well to remember Thomas Carlyle's advice, "The weakest creature by concentrating his power on single object can accomplish something; whereas the strongest by disposing his over many, may fail to accomplish anything".

COVERAGE OF THE SERVICE SUBJECTS (NDA)

Not only the weightage given to service subjects is unsatisfactory in terms of time but even the substance of it does not seem to focus on producing a serious soldier of the future. In NDA, for instance, out of 1061 total periods allotted to service subjects, 661 i.e., 66% are allotted to PT, Drill, Equitation and the remainder to elementary initiation to weapon training (24 periods) Map reading (30 periods) and elementary introduction to administrative aspects (37 periods). There are three outdoor camps which could be taken on by any boy scout organisation. It will be pertinent to point out here that in the Soviet military system, a youth organisation called DOSAAF manages to import much more military expertise to the ordinary youth in the school who has not even been selected or has opted for Army as a career.

LOPSIDED BIAS

Besides the lopsided emphasis on drill and PT exhausts a cadet so much that he is incapable of paying much attention to the acade-

mics either. Thus pulled between two inherently contradictory requirements which is not scientifically moderated, the hapless fellow seems to land nowhere. One knows of cadets who will report sick to be able to devote time to studies on which their grading depends.

COVERAGE OF SERVICE SUBJECTS (IMA)

IMA would apparently seem to tackle the professional aspects more seriously. But here too one may note dissipation of effort and rather limited objectives. Although substantial time is allocated to essential military subjects such as PT (277), Drill (234), Weapon training (232), Radio Telephony (44), Field Engineering (51), Technical training (374), Map reading (132), it still leaves the officer cadet a neophyte in comparison to his counterpart in other modern Armies specially USA, USSR, Israel and Germany. This is more so in the present professional environment where, like in any other sphere of activity, the explosion of knowledge is awesome and the time to catch on with it much too little. It is worth considering whether—

- (a) The cadet at the IMA should not be familiarised with the other arms such as armour, artillery, mechanised infantry, air defence artillery and missiles.
- (b) Introduced to the automatic data processing systems. (ADPS)
- (c) Introduced to the functioning of services such as ASC, Ordnance and EME.
- (d) Instructed and practised in staff work at junior level, say Junior Staff Course (JSC or GICO).
- (e) Fully acquainted with battalion support weapons. In our own context, in one training year an infantry battalion is able to achieve the following professional instructional objectives :—

	<i>Duration Periods</i>	<i>Weeks</i>
(a) An infantry company oriented training cycle upto coy level.	318	8
(b) MMG new entrants cadre	336	8
(c) Mor new entrants cadre	336	8
(d) Signals new entrants cadre	400	10
(e) Pioneer new entrants cadre	168	4
(f) Anti tank gun new entrants cadre	168	4
(g) Medical cadre	100	3
	<hr/> 1826 <hr/>	<hr/> 45 <hr/>

In addition, the men are put through collective training exercises at battalion and brigade levels for a fortnight. The point being made is that it is practicable to impart much more meaningful training to the officer cadet in the time available if we made up our mind not to make it also our business to groom them as gentleman too by wasting their time on exposure to pot pourri of subjects. The professional objectives for the cadets may perhaps be hitched a little higher in view of their definitely higher calibre and motivation.

A SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE

With the time, funds resources and a reasonable quality of motivated human material available, it is well within our reach to produce perhaps the best military leader in the world. In the words of Colonel Dupny : 'institutionalise genius'. Provided of course the present philosophy and the concept were replaced in favour of more pragmatic pattern. The pattern of training could then be as under.

THE SUGGESTED PATTERN

First Year. The officer cadet should be put through a complete familiarisation programme pertaining to infantry which is presently the basic arm of our Army. This would comprise physical training, weapon training, field craft, battalion support weapons course (i.e. mortars, medium machine guns and anti tank wpns), signals and unit administration. This training schedule should culminate in a unit level exercise.

Second Year. In the second year the cadet should be put through abridged ie Core Versions of young officers courses of armour, artillery, Engineers and capsule versions of YO courses of ASC, Ordnance.

Third Year. This year the Army cadets should be attached for a period of six months each to Navy and Air Force. The attachment should be of the pattern of midshipment's to their assigned ships in that they should go to live and work on board the ships to understand the ethos and work culture and equipment of the Navy. Similar attachment should be carried out in the next half of the year with the Air Force.

Fourth Year. In the fourth year having graduated from NDA, the cadet would move to IMA. There he should be trained to enable him to command a company or armoured squadron and also to do staff work upto grade 3 level (ie for Captain's staff appointments).

FINISHED PRODUCT

Thus the subaltern who would join his unit now will be an expert in the manner of medical, engineer or law graduate. He would be equipped with the essential theoretical knowledge of his profession. Now it will be upto his inclination or genius to apply it to a given assignment or situation.

CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS

The above pattern will imply the following major policy decisions and structural changes.

Resolving the Degree Syndrome. We Indians are obsessed and intimidated by degrees. Army has equally caught the infection. Mainly, this is sought after to improve one's post retirement employment prospects in a private or public concern. In actual fact, except in the case of engineers and doctors, the degree is hardly looked at by one's prospective employer who employs an Army officer taking into consideration his experience and exposure. Then he secures himself further by various conditions of contract which ensure that he can get rid of an inefficient employee if the latter fails to perform. Thus the degree of BSc/BA conferred by NDA seems to serve no real purpose. However, in order to assure the officer cadre, the government could enact a statute whereby an officer after a given period of service may be deemed qualified to be employed in those areas where he is currently employed with a graduation degree.

Elimination of Academics from the Syllabi. With the need of degree eliminated, the need for academics from the syllabi is obviously eliminated. This could be substituted by certain job oriented subjects such as management studies, computers and electronics.

Without doubt this would not be manageable in the time of available at the IMA ie, one and a half year. Perhaps this could be done if—

- (a) In the case of NDA entry, their NDA tenure could be more service oriented as suggested above.
- (b) In the case of direct entry cadets the tenure could be increased to two years. To compensate for the time lost as regards earning one's pay, it could be compensated by giving them midshipmen like stipend in the third and fourth terms instead of only last term as proposed by the Fourth Pay Commission.
- (c) Subjects such as Military law, Regimental Accounts, Methods of Instruction and others could be ruthlessly eliminated to be taken care of at a later date in one's Regimental tenures.

(d) Academic periods be reduced substantially. English, Hindi (except compulsory standard) languages, History, Economics etc should be eliminated. Similarly also the equivalent science subjects. After all have't we admitted graduates in the IMA? And what do we expect to teach them in 160 periods that they would not have done in the colleges/Universities? The Academics at IMA do not seem to make much sense.

CONCLUSION

It is felt that our training syllabi at NDA and IMA is not oriented to producing competent professional soldiers. The structure of academic subjects covered is excessively ambitious and leads to dissipation of effort and is not conducive to the aim of these institution which ought to be spelt out as to produce more of professional officers and not smooth and shallow gentleman and worse soldiers.

The fact that the general academic standards in the schools have gone up considerably compared to two decades ago and taking into account also the fact that all our cadets enter the NDA or IMA after securing well over 60 per cent marks in academic entrance examinations, we could afford to drastically reduce the weightage on academics and increase the same on service subjects. The structure of service subjects should be broadened to include new developments and technologies as indeed the knowledge of all arms and services because a modern battle field is an integrated one. Military history should be considered a service subject and the cadets initiated into it at this stage in a serious manner.

Another advantage of such a system will be to decelerate or even prevent the turbulence in the officer cadre at the unit level. Presently, a young officer is more less constantly away on courses of instruction or leave for at least five years. The impact of his leadership is not felt for all this time. To the men, he is one more nuisance whose antics have to be tolerated without any compensatory return in terms of professional leadership.

It may also save the exchequer fair amount of money by reducing the number of such establishments.

But most important upshot of such instruction will be a considerably more professionally oriented Army and hence much more security to the nation. However, this will not spell the end of training of officers, but the instruction henceforth will form the content of Post Commission Training.

What's Wrong With Our Performance Appraisal System

LT COL NN BHATIA, THE KUMAON REGIMENT

GENERAL

IF the management of any organisation to-day followed the same systems of performance appraisal that were common when the pyramids were built, most of the organisations would have closed down their personnel departments and writing of this article would have become redundant. Perception of management of 'human resources' has become extremely complex over the period due to rapid industrialisation, super specialisation, changing values, economic constraints, regeneration of behavioural sciences and overall changes in political and social environment.

Any working organisation, may it be a church or university, civic body or a factory needs people who are fully motivated, involved and capable of aligning individual goals with that of organisational goals. Organisational goals have to be transcribed into various jobs by carrying out process of job descriptions and job specifications and broken into bits and pieces and appropriate people with matching skills have to be found to undertake these jobs. This ensures maximum employee's participation in the areas of decision making and identification with the organisation and its goals. Appraisal system of the organisation, therefore, should provide means of assessing the extent of individual's participation, his level of competence and potential and evidence of success in attaining this end. The broad objective of any organisation while evaluating human resources should be to provide accurate, unbiased and timely evaluation of the capabilities of the "Current human resources" with "a forward look" towards future needs. It should provide needs of self actualisation and spell out individual's inter and intra-personal relationship and traits of leadership, responsibility, initiative, dependability and so on without any subjectivity. Thus, there is a constant requirement to accurately measure the quality of individual's performance and ability to predict the same under future conditions. With this in the background, it is essential that leadership in the army is assessed accurately and

impartially to determine their employment and protect their advancement.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existing system of performance appraisal of officers and suggest remedial actions, if any on its shortcomings.

THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

The present system of appraisal is a refinement of the old one and was evolved in the late sixties to overcome certain basic shortcomings, yet sadly it has fallen short of our needs and expectations and conviction has been built in most of the officers that system is exceedingly faulty. However, if indepth analysis of the system is carried out, it will appear that no matter how well a system is conceived, its efficacy will depend upon how it's application is enforced without any subjectivity.

SHORT COMINGS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF APPRAISAL

(a) *Varying Standards.* One of the major lacuna in the present system of appraisal arises out of the varying standards of evaluations. Thus one evaluator may consistently rate higher than his colleagues while another may do in the reverse. Again, each evaluator is deeply involved in his subordinates performance, their morale, up bringing, degree of social grace and other extraneous and non-professional influences which have a bearing on his assessment. It may sound funny but it's a fact that same person doing the same job may be evaluated differently by the different evaluations and at times by the same evaluator differently on different occasions. These variations in appraisal greatly affect the career of countless officers.

(b) *Halo Effect.* Our inverted sense of values based on caste, colour and creed, old boys net like Rimcolians, Modernites or country cousins and so on and perception to allow one quality or trait to colour the entire appraisal have added "halo effect" which effects the very purpose of appraisal. An officer making a good impression upon initiating officer due to one strong tract thus will be rated high while on the other hand an outstanding weakness or lacking social glamour may lower the rating in several or all other qualities.

(c) *Inflated Reports.* Another common deficiency in reporting pattern is to give exaggerated reports to subordinates which they really do not deserve. Thus, subordinates are credited with the performance for which no matching abilities have been displayed. As immediate superiors we deeply get involved in keeping the team happy by overlooking justice and fair play. Again, it is a general belief that officers who are themselves rated high possibly rate their subordinates similarly. This practice leads to putting the mediocre stuff in top brackets resulting in our having so many undistinguished Napoleons. This wholesale inflation in reporting makes MS Branch's task difficult to distinguish between a mule and a horse not forgetting the species in between the two extremes. Needless to say, it vitiates the system of objective reporting for which the basic parameter should be "Overall demonstrated performance in achieving the goals set for the organisation".

(d) *Under Rated Reports.* On the other extreme many raters do not evaluate their subordinates as per current standards and thus, "Many Napoleons to be" die in infancy. There can be many reasons for the subjectivity viz high standards set by the reporting officers" or they themselves being rated low by their superiors whereby their frustrations are manifested in their reporting pattern. Such assessing officers do unwarranted damage to their subordinates.

(e) *Unbalanced Reports.* It is sad to say that most of us have not learnt the simple act of writing the performance appraisal of our subordinates though exhaustive manuals to guide the initiating officers have been issued from time to time by the MS Branch. The remedy for this malaise, on the face of it, looks simple as all we need to do is to simply comply with the instructions given in the redbook. Unfortunately such an idea is erroneous for it overlooks the challenge posed by the human element. That is why one could see many a reports where an officer say in administrative capability or physical fitness is graded above average but in pen picture commented that "he should go in greater details while administering his sub unit" or "Officer should play more games to be physically fit". Nothing could be more ridiculous than such a reporting pattern which is grossly unfair.

(f) *Central Tendency.* Central tendency is the inclination to rate all or most of the qualities and subordinates close to the

middle range of 5 or 6 points as in our system to avoid extremes. Such lukewarm reporting to high calibre officers vis a vis dead wood will show that while former is grossly harmed, the latter gets the benefit of doubt. The reality as well as absurdity of this is evident in a report of Mr Albert. P. Maslon wherein he says that in recent large scale study in a Department of Defence Organisation of USA supervisors rated 90% of their employees as superior to the average employee working in the jobs studied. Central tendency also exists in the subordinates consequently to which they avoid taking risks. Their false norm being by doing "No Work" one does "No wrong".

(g) *Performance Counselling.* Though the present system caters for performance counselling it lays no norms how it is to be administered. Today's officer is more conscious and it is debatable whether fair appraisal can be done with or without formal counselling. The point is, that appraisal and counselling are two separate activities in management of human resources. In any case appraisal being confidential in nature, counselling on it may obviously appear inappropriate. Infact the distinction between counselling and appraisal is hardly understood by both raters and ratees and what actually is discussed between the two is generally appraisal. Counselling can only be effectively done by a person who is well apted in behavioral sciences. Does our organisation have assessing and reviewing officers in horizontal plain who do all the counselling (presently a lip service) qualified in the same sense as teachers in schools or universities? Is their criticism and suggestion taken in the same spirit as that of parents to tiny tots? These are some of the pertinent questions which our system does not speak about. Again, some management experts in the west feel that counselling may have side effects which interfere with evaluation system and individual shortcomings discussed during counselling sessions may be taken as threat to self esteem by the people being rated upon.

(h) *Employment on Command and Staff Jobs.* Over employment of non psc officers on command jobs is a major lacuna in our reporting system. A very senior non psc officer once commented during an informal gathering that though he has commanded a Brigade and Division, yet he could not be a BM or GSO 1 (Ops) being a non psc. It is essential to remember that all promotions in the army are command oriented and on promotion an officer should be able command troops in a higher

rank. Inspite of this, staff course qualified officers are employed on command for just two years to get two mandatory command reports while a non psc officer may have to command a unit for 3 to 4 years. This is a strange logic and puts such officers at great disadvantage as these officers after command tenure have narrow employment spectrum. Thus, after a long command tenure these officers are shoved in jobs which do not matter at all. This needs rationalisation in our system as we have good, bad and indifferent officers on both sides of the fence.

(j) *Assessment of Reviewing and Superior Reviewing Officers in the Chain of Reporting.* Though the present appraisal system lays down minimum 90 days physical service under the initiating officer no such mandatory requirement exists in the ladder upwards. Having served for a 'day makes it obligatory for ROs and SROs to comment and assess the officer. It should be appreciated how justice could be met in such an awkward situations specially when ROs and SROs seldom see and evaluate performance of individual being hardly in any contact with officer reported upon.

(k) *Dual Standards.* It is for consideration whether officers be shown their performance appraisals. In between, for a short period this practice was withdrawn and reports were not shown to officers. Since the system was reversed in a short time, its efficacy cannot be ascertained. Ask any company commander whether he would like to show reports of JCOs and NCOs initiated by him and the majority would say No. Yet he would not only like to see his report but try even to peep through the portion which he is not supposed to see. We cannot maintain double standards and get away by not being branded as hypocrites.

(l) *Over Worked and Under staffed MS Branch.* Its pity to see handful of officers in the MS Branch working in miserable working conditions in dingy and ill equipped rooms with limited civilian staff. In fact the civilian clerical staff, which seldom changes has such a strong lobby in the MS Branch that real fate of all the officers is at their whims and fancy. Service officers are posted there for normal tenure of 2-3 years out of which first 6 months they take to know their jobs and last 6 months they spend in sorting out their own and problems of their units where ultimately they are to move. Computer programming in MS Branch has not kept pace with the workload and filing and updating system

is out dated and inefficient. Every year MS Branch gets over dozen of officers attached to catch up with yearly backlog. This aspect needs serious considerations.

(m) *No Training to Evaluating Officers.* One of the reasons for large variations in reporting pattern by various appraising officers in that no formal training facilities exist in writing of ACRs and counselling for appraising officers. Behavioural science is a complex subject although of recent origin and most of the officers in the chain of reporting lack training in the application of behavioural science while writing appraisals.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMEDIAL ACTION

Some officers can really argue that the problems and deficiencies that have been brought out above are really of the appraising officers and not of the system. Even if this criticism was altogether true, it must be appreciated that appraising officers are a part of the system. Our appraisal system should provide the MS Branch with the following :—

- (a) Adequate feed back on individuals performance.
- (b) Serve as basis for changing behaviour pattern towards more effective working environment.
- (c) Help in future jobs placements of officers.

However, the present system of performance appraisal hardly serves any of the above functions well. While the system should appraise results achieved by officers what it really does is how they do things. Suggested remedial actions are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Appraisal by Objective. Are we really sure of our objectives; are we clear as to what our organisation, units and sub units achieve within particular period of time? This can be answered by a simple test. Let each unit commander or staff officer precisely without gaps and overlap write down the objectives of the position held by him, his immediate superior and subordinate. If an officer can do so in less than half an hour, then he is already on the right track. If he takes something like 4-5 hours, I would say "do not lose heart, many will take even longer. Suggested broad objectives say for a rifle company commander to be achieved during a reporting year after mutual discussion are given in appendix. These have to be modified to suit the situation from time to time and for field to peace and so

on. At the end of the training and reporting year which would be one, group appraisal should be carried out keeping constraints and hinderances in mind and company commander appraised according to goals achieved.

Likewise for each command or staff job objectives can be laid down for the reporting year keeping the management principles of "input and output", "activity and result", and "job responsibility and job achievement". Each officer's job thus would specify :—

- (a) What is the purpose of (my) job?
- (b) What are the major key result areas in which I should be concentrating?
- (c) What objectives I shall achieve so that they match with the objective of the organisation for what my job is created?
- (d) What are likely constraints?

Group Appraisal. Having laid down the objectives by participative approach for the individuals and the unit/organisation, appraisal of groups achievement of these objectives should be made at the end of the each task and reporting year. Immediate superior should make entries in respective folders of each individual involved in accomplishment of the tasks/objectives. This information will at the end of the reporting period serve as basis of performance appraisal and self judgements and commented upon by the superiors in vertical plain. This will ensure that each member of the group gets verifiable information of his and groups performance and thus adjust their behaviours and effort accordingly.

Job Description. We have just one set of appraisal form for all the jobs. Thus present system of appraisal is not job oriented. It is mandatory that for every jobs whether in command, instruction or staff responsibilities and functions are described and what officer on these jobs is required to accomplish. Some of the parameters on which job descriptions can be made are :—

- (a) Major objectives of the job that can be quantified.
- (b) Results to be achieved.
- (c) Resources and constraints.
- (d) Strong and weak traits of person who is accomplishing the job.

Counselling. As discussed earlier efficacy of the performance counselling lies in the norms laid for it. Performance counselling

should be done periodically in the form of dialogue between appraiser and appraisee. This will ensure superior to face subordinates periodically, a responsibility too many shirk to do.

No Performance Appraisal for Certain Category of Officers. Every year we add to our fold 400-500 newly commissioned officers and much larger number as finally superseded officers. It is felt that no ACRs be initiated for finally superceeded officers and for the young officers for the first 3 years of service. It will cut down lot of infructions paper work at all levels and reduce work load in MS Branch.

Box Grading. There is a need to do away with the overall box grading. In the present system each initiating officer preconceives the grading first and then accordingly matches his gradings of various traits. It is suggested that overall grading be worked by the MS Branch after taking into considerations the grading given on all the traits by all officers in the chain of reporting.

Reviewing of the Reports. In the present system as discussed earlier there is no stipulation of period served under the reviewing and superior reviewing officers. Having served even one day under them makes it obligatory for them to comment and assess the officer. Thus credibility of the reporting in the system is doubted greatly and impairs faith in the system. In the light of these findings, mandatory period of minimum 90 days service under these officers must be laid down to ensure credibility and fairness of the system.

Attributes. Some of the attributes listed in the appraisal form are abstract and vague and thus cannot be quantified. Again they do not suit staff, instructional ERE and command jobs. All the qualities should be tested under the following heads and suitably modified to meet various jobs descriptions :—

- (a) Human relationship.
- (b) Job performance.
- (c) Personal characteristics.

Appraisal Training. To minimise subjectivity and variations in rating standards appraisal workshops of 2-3 days duration be conducted by the MS Branch where officers are exposed to capsule course in behavioural sciences and the skills in writing the appraisal reports. Thus, in a short period of time an "appraisal grid" can be formed and standard rating pattern will emerge.

{CONCLUSION

Our approach to whole system of performance appraisal deserves re-examination and fresh thinking. Large scale organisations like our army with their requirements of infinite variety of individual skills and characteristics demand a vast refinement in our appraisal system, perception of management of human resources in the complex socio-economic environment where technology innovation and independent thought are at premium making it obligatory to have participative approach which meets the aspirations of the individuals and that of the organisation. Result oriented appraisal or management by objectives should replace "Carrot and stick" approach so that assessment is done in terms of job descriptions and goals achieved. Each individual knowing the organisational goal, realigns his personal goals in accomplishment of the organisational goal. Systematic counselling and group appraisal will strengthen the system of objective reporting and thus ensures square pegs in square holes. It will re-inforce officers faith in the fairness of the system and quality of their involvement, creativity, efficiency, morale and commitment to the service will improve.

Appendix

(Refer to Para 7 of the paper)

APPRAISAL BY OBJECTIVE FOR RIFLE COMPANY
COMMANDER

GENERAL

A company commander is responsible for training, discipline and administration of his command. He shall be thoroughly acquainted with the professional ability and acquirements of all offfrs, JCOs and NCOs placed under his command (Ref para 37(a) of Regulation for the Army 1962). After mutual discussion with battalion commander who is turn would have had same process with his brigade commander would have set goals for the battalion to be achieved and possibly lay following goals for the rifle companies to be achieved in the reporting year :—

(a) *Physical Fitness and Endurance.* All ranks should be capable of marching 40 kms with full battle load in one night and be fit for operation. Following result in BPET/PPT will be laid :—

(i) Excellent	20%
(ii) Good	30%
(iii) Satisfactory	50%

(b) *Weapon Training.* All ranks should be proficient in handling individual weapons under battle conditions and detachment manning crew served weapons will be proficient in handling these weapons effectively under battle conditions. All ranks must fire annual range classification on and following results will be achieved :—

(i) TSOET	— 100%
(ii) <i>Grouping fire at 25 M</i>	
(aa) Supported position	— 5 cm
(ab) Unsupported position	— 7 cm
(ac) Standing position	— 9 cm.
(iii) <i>Classification Firing</i>	
(aa) MM	— 10%
(ab) 1st Class	— 20%
(ac) Standard shot	— 70%

(c) *Field Engineering.* All ranks should be capable of laying 1000 mine in 24 hours as part of mine laying party. Men found in squads should be able to lay following wire obstacles :—

	Day	Night
(i) LWE	36 minutes	54 minutes
(ii) Cut wire type I	48 „	72 „
(iii) „ type II	84 „	126 „
(iv) Double apron fence	72 „	108 „

(d) *Digging.* All ranks should be capable of digging following :

	Day	Night
(i) Fire trench	66 minutes	90 minutes
(ii) Weapon pit of RL/2" mor	75 "	120 "
(iii) <i>Revetting.</i> Troops should be perfect in Revetting of field works with CGI sheets and sand bags both during day and night.		

(e) *Map Reading.* NCOs/JCOs should be proficient in map to ground and ground to map reading both in day and night under battle conditions. All other ranks with 2 to 5 years of service should achieve MR standard II.

(f) *Education.* At least 60% of strength should pass one step higher educational examination. There should be NO RT in the sub units.

(g) *Sports/Competitions.* Company should win atleast two sports and professional inter-company competition.

(h) *Operational Training.* Company should be capable to undertake operation as part of the battalion and be capable to accomplish task assigned.

(j) *Administration.* This should be adjudged by the following aspects :—

- (i) No of disciplinary cases.
- (ii) Losses of controlled stores, identity cards and classified documents.
- (iii) Sick reports and health of troops.
- (iv) No of audit objections and debit balances.
- (v) Motivation and welfare achieved.
- (vi) Any special achievements in the fields of sports, training, administration or operations.

(k) Human relations personality traits compatability and ability to influence Group.

After the mutual goals setting, company commander should get free hand to train and administer his company. Regular counselling (say once in each quarter) should be done by the commanding officer. At the end of the training year group appraisal be done of the company as a whole and thus appraisal of each individual in the company could be done commensurate with the goals/results achieved by the company/subunit.

Barrackpore Cantonment

LT GEN S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC

THE military cantonment which gave Barrackpore its name was first established as the major cantonment for the Bengal Army of the East India Company in 1772, its original name being Chanak according to the "Imperial Gazetteer" (1907). In 1785 the Government also acquired a property of seventy acres with two bungalows for the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army. In September 1787, the "Calcutta Gazette" commented on the unusually high rate of suicide among the military cadets of the Bengal Army, "To what cause to impute this melancholy disposition we know not, nor can we pretend to say whether in any respect it can be ascribed to the climate".

According to Mark Bence-Jones in "Palaces of the Raj" (1973). "The mongrel name of Barrackpore carries in it the whole romance of British India—Historically speaking, (Government House) Barrackpore is the equal of Government House, Calcutta, having been the scene of as many crucial meetings and far-reaching decisions". In 1801 Lord Wellesley had appropriated the Commander-in-Chief's residence as a country residence for himself and his successors. In 1804, the house was found to be unsafe, so Wellesley ordered it to be pulled down and rebuilt. Having finished his residence in Calcutta, he decided that the new house at Barrackpore should be on a no less palatial scale; he contemplated joining the two Government Houses by a straight avenue. Wellesley's second residence reached plinth height when the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London recalled him as a punishment for his extravagance in building the first. They were angrier when they heard of the Barrackpore project, which was to cost a further £50,000. It stood for some years like a ruin. Lord Hastings contemplated finishing it in a more modest way, but having decided instead to enlarge the temporary house which Wellesley had built a short distance upstream, he pulled the plinth high structure down, and his wife erected a greenhouse on the site. Wellesley had enlarged the Barrackpore Park to nearly 350 acres, clearing jungle and swamp. To the north of the house, where

a Watercourse had been drained to form a valley, there is a Corinthian temple known as the Temple of Fame, built by the first Lord Minto in memory of the officers who fell during his conquests of Mauritius and Java in 1810 and 1811. As the years went by the number of buildings adorning the garden and park increased. Apart from buildings, almost every Lat (Lord) Sahib or his lady added something to the garden and grounds of Government House, Barrackpore.

The people who came to stay at Barrackpore included many civilians, officers and clergy, who, together with their respective families came for a rest-cure. Percival Spear in "The Nabobs" (1963) narrates, "After 1756...the custom began of erecting garden houses outside the city in the Garden Reach, Baraset, Barrackpore, etc." H.E.A. Cotton also records in "Calcutta Old and New" (1909), "Every Englishman who was able, avoided the plague stricken air of Calcutta." When Bishop Heber stayed at Barrackpore in 1823, he met lynxes and other strange animals being taken for an airing in the park. They came from the menagerie, which had its origin in Wellesley's abortive natural history institute. The animals included, at various times, tigers, leopards, bears, rhinoceroses and a giraffe, as well as many rare birds. At the time of Lord Auckland, a rhinoceros took to straying in the park and chased a neighbour, who was annoyed when the Governor-General laughed. Lady Dalhousie made a pet of one of the bears and kept in her room; her daughter, Lady Susan Ramsay, the wife to be of a future Governor of Madras, became very attached to it after her mother's death. 'It was Lady Susan's sole recommendation to me for kindness', Lady Canning remarked sadly, on her first visit to Barrackpore, 'and I am rather at a loss how to show it. I suppose a lump of cake now and then will do'. In addition to the animals of the menagerie, eight or a dozen elephants were usually kept at Barrackpore, part of the Governor-General's or Viceroy's hathikhana, and were used for riding about in the park, and in the surrounding country. At its peak, the Governor General's hathikhana had 146 elephants lodged in Calcutta and Barrackpore and used as transportation for the Governor General's tours.

Even before 1857, there was a mutiny of sepoys at Barrackpore in 1824, which was quelled, some sepoys were shot, some drowned while escaping, some hanged, in what Lady Amherst described as 'a frightful scene—English soldiers firing on British uniforms, pursuing them in all directions'. The unit in question was the 47th Bengal

Native Infantry Regiment which had been ordered to Burma by sea for the First War 1824. It refused to cross the "Kala Pani" but was prepared to go by the land route with the forces launched from Chittagong. The unit was disbanded. This mutiny is covered in "British India's First Freedom Movement, 1820-30" by Subarna and Asoklal Ghose (1983). It was not however the first Indian unit to have mutined. Mutinies of Indian unit had been occurring since 1780.

It was always a scramble for promotion in the Bengal Army based at Barrackpore Cantonment. After Ensign J.S. Rawlins of the 45th Bengal Infantry saved a brother officer from drowning in the early 1840s, as quoted by Theon Wilkinson in "Two Monsoons" (1976) from certain private diaries and family papers, "...and the way he repaid me for saving his life, was by keeping me out of my promotion, for I was the senior Ensign for three years afterwards. He was a delicate youth, always took the character of a female in our charades and plays—poor fellow! He died in 1849 and made me a Lieutenant". Young Ensign Stanhope Cary describes life at Barrackpore Cantonment in 1855: 'Occupation—Get up at half past four, parade from five to six, go to Mess where all the officers meet (at what is called Coffee Shop) and drink a cup of coffee—home and dress and bathe by 9—breakfast—ten to half past eleven private drill at home—two, tiffin at Mess—about half past five I go into the Park with my dogs after the jackals and dine at Mess at half past seven, play one rubber or game of billiards and retire to bed about ten o'clock—the next day and every day the same, the intervals being occupied in writing, reading and painting, yclept daubing'. Perhaps the routine was duller in Barrackpore than in some cantonments owing to the presence of a Brigadier who was 'a fearful religious fanatic' and 'forbids balls, races, private theatricals and all amusements'. The same Ensign complains about the promotion system, which only the hand of death can adjust, "I got 7 Addiscombe (the East India Company Cadet Training College) fellows over my head that have not yet left England, because I did not go up for my examination a fortnight sooner than I did, it really is a great shame that the E.I. folks in Leadenhall Street dont warn you of these things...not that these 7 fellows make any difference now, and perhaps they never will, but if they live they will be seriously in my way." In a letter from Barrackpore to his parents of July 1855, Cary reports, "The Colonel's maniac enough to order me to go to afternoon parades. I'll see him dead. The insanity of going to parade on open ground with only a forage cap on, in the very height of the hot weather...I'll see him dead first, wouldn't you".

Despite Barrackpore being healthier than Calcutta, Cary nevertheless developed a fever, "They had forty leeches on my throat and followed them up with lots of blisters and I got better". In 1862 he died a Lieutenant, at Lalitpur (M.P.).

The river afforded a most convenient way of travelling between Barrackpore and Calcutta. The 'Sonamukhi', the Governor-General's State Yacht, a very luxurious house-boat, was originally pulled by men walking along the bank, but later towed by a steamer. It was accompanied by a flotilla of State Barges, carrying rather more than 400 servants : 'such a simple way of going to pass two nights in the country, Emily Eden, Lord Auckland's sister, observed. Other servants had already gone ahead, for there was no permanent domestic staff at Barrackpore. 'All the establishment that is left at Calcutta is established here before we arrive,' she records. Two days later, everybody was back at Government House, Calcutta.

There was always the problem for the Governor General whether to invite to Government House, Barrackpore, only the military from the neighbouring cantonment, and risk offending Calcutta society, or whether to extend the invitations to those who had to come all the way from Calcutta, in which case, if it was a bad night, more than half the guests would be sure not to turn up. Emma Roberts in "Scenes and Characteristics of Hindostan" (1837) describes how a ball at Barrackpore in the time of Lord and Lady William Bentinck was spoilt by a south-westerly gale, 'A very large proportion of the guests determined to go up by water, anticipating a delightful excursion by starlight; but the horrors of the storm burst upon them ere they could reach their destination; the Hughli ran mountains high, washing over the decks of the frail little summer-vessels, and driving many on shore, to the consternation of the passengers and the utter ruin of their ball-dresses...the party, when collected at last, presented a most lugubrious spectacle, a concourse of wet, weary, miserable guests, eagerly impatient to return to their homes, yet compelled to await more favourable weather.'

'Barrackpore is delicious and takes the sting out of India', wrote the first Lord Minto. Lord Dalhousie and his wife so loved Barrackpore that after she died he could not bear to go near it for two years. Lady Canning also loved the place, and when she died in 1861 she was buried in the garden, within sight of the river. The circumstances of her death were poignant. Countess Canning was a talented person.

At one time she was Lady of the Bedchamber to Queen Victoria; they corresponded regularly, and the Queen once wrote to her 'if it was not for the heat and the insects how much I would like to see India'. She landscaped the Viceregal gardens at Barrackpore, encouraged photography, wrote, sketched and painted. It was while painting rare orchids in the forests below Darjeeling that she apparently contracted what was diagnosed at Purnea on the journey back as 'jungle fever'—cerebral malaria. She was brought back to Calcutta as quickly as possible, the journey taking four days, and she died ten days later at the age of 44, on 18 November 1861. Her body was borne that night on a gun carriage the eighteen miles to Barrackpore, the place she loved and which she continually strove to make more beautiful. Lord Canning never recovered from the blow. Their was a true love marriage, made in the teeth of parental opposition, as their families came from opposing political parties. He had fainted with shock four days earlier on first learning that she had an incurable illness and he became 'an old decrepit man from the day of her death'. He visited her grave every night after dark when he was at Barrackpore, and a lamp was kept burning at the grave by which he used to read and re-read her papers, letters and diaries until he broke down altogether.

Lady Canning's burial place was chosen with great care, under some beautiful casuarina trees by the river where she used to sit and paint. Her tomb was designed by her sister, Louisa Lady Waterford, and consisted of a catafalque and headstone, all of marble, inlaid with Moghul designs and standing within a large enclosure surrounded by iron railings in the shape of her monogrammed initials. Engraved upon the tomb was the husband's tribute:

Honours and praises written on a tomb are at best a vain glory; but that her charity, humility, meekness and watchful faith in her Saviour will, for that Saviour's sake, be accepted of God, and be to her a glory everlasting, is the firm trust of those who know her best, and most dearly loved her in life and who cherish the memory of her departed. Sacred to the Memory of Charlotte Elisabeth, eldest daughter of Lord Stuart De Rothsay, wife of Charles John, Viscount and Earl Canning, first Viceroy of India. Born at Paris 31st March 1817. Died at Calcutta 18th November 1861.

But no sooner was the engraving completed than the following was added:

The above words were written on the 22nd November 1861 by Earl Canning who survived his wife but seven months. He left

India on the 18th March, died in London on the 17th June aged 49 and was buried in Westminster Abbey on the 21st June 1862.

While Lady Canning's body continues to rest undisturbed in the garden at Barrackpore, the original monument above it deteriorated from the heat and rains, that it was removed first to St. Paul's Cathedral, Calcutta, and then to its present place in the north portico of St. John's Church, Calcutta, being replaced by a simpler replica with the same inscription. In the words of The Hon. Wilkinson, "So Charlotte Canning sleeps alone beneath the shade of those beautiful trees with the sacred river of the Hindus flowing nearby; still in touch as she would have wished, with the India that awoke in her an enhanced awareness of life."

After 1857, the progressive reduction of the Barrackpore garrison ensued with the troops now being relocated in the North West. From 1864 onwards the Viceroys spent the hot weather at Simla, so that Barrackpore became just a weekend retreat, having formerly been lived in for several months of the year. The Boat Establishment, made obsolete by railways, was replaced by a couple of steam launches. The menagerie, having declined, was done away with in the late eighteen-seventies by Lord Lytton, and the Viceroy ceased to keep elephants in 1895. After the Government of India moved to Delhi, Government House Barrackpore was handed over to the Governor of Bengal. Today, the Governor of West Bengal and his staff still use some of the bungalows on some occasions, but the main house is a Police hospital. Barrackpore Cantonment in modern times includes an Air Force Station.

Ethos of the Assam Rifles

JOE

(Army officers are sent to the Assam Rifles on deputation and there is no option for them. At present there are about 350 on deputation. Most of them come with pre-conceived ideas as regards the Force, and these are : we are going to a police force, this is the dead end for us. This article is written with a view to dispelling their doubts).

IT was in 1835 that the Cachar Levy was raised by one Mr Grange, in civil charge of Nowgong district and from this Levy is descended the present Assam Rifles. As the name implies, the Cachar Levy was merely a Levy—a collection of men ill armed, partially trained, haphazardly organised, poorly clothed and miserably paid, all under a civil officer. It was essentially a civil force and its task was to keep away the marauding hill tribes—Nagas and Lushais—from devastating the plains of Assam, where tea gardens, owned entirely by English Companies, flourished. It merely acted as the “strong arm” of the local administration.

Gradually, as the “forward policy” was adopted by the Government, the task of the Levy changed from mainly defensive to positively offensive and with it changed the name of the Force and its entire character. It first became the Frontier Police, then Military Police and then after the 1914-1918 Great War, “Rifles”, in appreciation of excellent service rendered, honours and awards won and casualties suffered. In spite of this evolution, it did not become a military force—though it co-operated with the army in many frontier and trans-frontier expeditions and even some of its men joined the Gorkha Regiments as volunteers, in Great War—but remained under the Assam Government as its own Private Army. As Sir Robert Reid, the last but one British Governor of Assam States : “The organization is a military one, but every man is enrolled as a police officer”. This was only logical because of the political and geographical conditions of the Assam and its surrounding areas. The Force now became the right hand of the Civil and the left hand of the Military and functioned as such in its long and chequered history, right upto 1955 or so.

Living and operating in undeveloped jungles and hills, the men of the Force were not only infantry soldiers but also pioneers. They could wield spades and shovels, picks and axes, hammers and crow-bars, trowels and plum bob, and various other tools as effectively as their fire-arms. The men could house themselves not only on service but also in permanent station and the barracks built by men of 1 AR under Lt Col Loch their Commandant at Aizawl almost 80 years ago are still housing the men of 1 AR. A living testimony to their efficiency and versatility. They also made hundreds of miles of hill roads and every battalion could produce numbers of men experts in handling boats, rafts and in bridging—a most important qualification in a land of big and rapid rivers. Field Marshal Lord Roberts, VC, of Royal Engineers who as a Colonel accompanied a military expedition to the Lushai Hills in 1871, recounts in his book "Forty One Years in India", how when a young Sapper officer accompanying the expedition was baffled when he came across a river, the men of the Frontier Police quickly constructed an improvised bridge with local material, even as the Sappers officer was getting ready with his calculations! These qualifications have stood the Force in good stead in post-independence period, when developmental activities were pursued with great vigour by the Government of India in the tribal areas. As Shri K. L. Mehta, ICS, once Adviser to the Governor of Assam put it ".....the men of the Assam Rifles have assisted the Agency Administration in several of its development activities, such as the building of tracks and roads, growing of vegetables, the enumeration of population and even in spreading literacy amongst the people".

The Force has proud traditions of extending a helping hand for humanitarian causes and in natural calamities. One or two examples will suffice to prove this point. When thousands of refugees were pouring into India after the conquest of Burma by the Japanese in 1941, it was the Assam Rifles which received them, cared for them and helped them in every possible way. Similarly, when the Dalai Lama fled Tibet, and the Chinese occupied it, it was the Assam Rifles which received him and his entourage at the frontier, and guided and escorted him to Tezpur. Appreciating the excellent work done by the Assam Rifles, His Holiness wrote the following blessings in Tibetan in the Visitor's Book of the Assam Rifles Training Centre :

"MAY YOUR LUCK INCREASE TO THE SIZE OF A MOUNTAIN"

MAY YOUR FAME BE SUCH AS TO COVER THE WHOLE
SKY (UNIVERSE)

MAY YOUR KNOWLEDGE BECOME VAST AND DEEP
AS THE SEA

LONG AND HEALTHY LIVES TO YOU AND HOPE YOUR
WORK FOR OTHERS WILL BE A SUCCESS".

The Force once again showed its worth during the great earthquake of 1950 which struck Assam and brought great devastation and suffering to thousands of people. Shri Jairamdas Daulatram, the then Governor of Assam, paid a tribute to the Force in following words :

".....The Great Earthquake of 1950 showed that the Assam Rifles were not only an armed force for civil or military purpose but they constituted a well disciplined volunteer corps for the service of the people at a time of grave danger and dire distress".

On the military side also, the Force has an enviable record, having taken part in one way or other, in both world wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 and having won numerous decorations of all types for gallantry and good work. These traditions are being followed even to this day and in the counter-insurgency role in which the Force has been engaged in the last quarter of a century, it has done equally well. It has to its credit a long list of gallantry decorations, including three much coveted Ashoka Chakras—the highest gallantry award that can be won in peace time. The Force is also in great demand—by the Civil Administration, by the Army and by the locals—because it is trusted, respected and loved by all of them. From seven battalions in 1953, it has expanded to thirty battalions in 1987, a four-fold increase in 35 years. Since independence it has won the following gallantry and good service awards, a truly impressive list.

Ashoka Chakra	—	3
Vir Chakra	—	5
Kirti Chakra	—	25
Shaurya Chakra	—	77
Sena Medal	—	53
Param Vishisht Seva Medal	—	1
Ati Vishisht Seva Medal	—	6
Vishisht Seva Medal	—	33
<hr/>		
Total		203

The high efficiency of the Force is due essentially to the fact that it is modelled on army lines and is officered entirely by army officers on deputation or released army officers re-employed in the Force. This however as we have seen, was not the case in early days. Then the battalions were commanded by Civil Police officers and this lasted till 1882 when Army officers on deputation started coming in. To help the Commandants, subordinate British Police Officers were appointed as European Subedar Majors and this practice lasted till 1904. When the post of European Subedar Major was abolished, Sergeants were taken on deputation from British Army to assist the Commandants in training recruits and help in interior administration. Later on, Sergeants vanished and one Assistant Commandant was authorised in each battalion and he too was an army officer on deputation. At present the authorisation is 15 officers. British officers of the Indian Army, particularly from Gorkha Rifles started coming from about 1900 onwards and the Assam Rifles was affiliated to Gorkha Group of the Indian Army vide Army Instruction (India) No. 213 of 1925, as under :

- 1 AR to 2 and 9 GR
- 2 AR to 7 and 10 GR
- 3 AR to 1 and 4 GR
- 4 AR to 5 and 6 GR
- 5 AR to 3 and 8 GR

The Force has gradually but steadily been so much integrated with the army, in so many ways—unlike other para-military forces—that it can almost be called “mini-army”. Take for example; the rank nomenclature. It is, Rifleman, Naik, Havildar, Naib Subedar, Subedar, Subedar Major and not Constable, Head Constable, Assistant Sub-Inspector, Inspector as in other para-military forces. Same goes for dress, training, education and staff work. All ranks are clothed in olive green, attend courses at army training schools, qualify in Army Education Examinations. Selected JCOs who have put in long and distinguished service get honorary ranks of Captains and Lieutenants. This does not happen in other para-military forces. Similarly, the Force has the unique distinction of providing a Junior Commissioned Officer as Honorary ADC to the President which no other para-military force has.

Some ways in which the integration with the army took place are enumerated below :—

- (a) In 1925, orders were passed by the Government of India, affiliating the Assam Rifles to various Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army.

- (b) Orders were issued in the early twenties that a selected batch of AR men will go every year to the Gorkha Rifles affiliated regiment for training. The Officer Commanding and Subedar Major of the Gorkha Rifles were allowed to go and visit affiliated battalions of the Assam Rifles.
- (c) Subedar Majors with distinguished service were deputed to attend the coronation of the King and Queen in the United Kingdom in 1937.
- (d) Army system of clothing was introduced in 1938 for four years and since this proved beneficial, it was accepted.
- (e) Campaign medals were issued whenever AR took part in a campaign with the army.
- (f) Sons of Indian Officers (now known as JCOs) were sent to King George's Royal Indian Military Schools at Jullunder and Ajmer on the same lines as sons of VCOs (now JCOs) of the Indian Army.
- (g) Assam Rifles battalions were periodically inspected by senior Army Generals (on invitation). An extract from a flattering report on inspection by Field Marshal Lord Birdwood when he inspected 2 Assam Rifles in 1926, is given below :—

"Though I have served over 41 years in India, I had no previous opportunity of seeing or inspecting a Bn of Assam Rifles, and I must honestly confess I had not expected to find anything nearly so smart as the very fine body of men which I found on parade."

The Assam Rifles took as much, or perhaps even more interest, than the Army in welfare of the men and their families. Vocational training for men proceeding on pension was started as early as 1935 when the Army perhaps did not have such a scheme. And even earlier—in 1928—a Girl's School was established in 1 Assam Rifles to educate the daughters of the men of 1 Assam Rifles—a scheme perhaps unheard of in the Army of those days.

The Force is a happy blend of both Military and Civil and therefore unique in character. It has produced a number of senior Army officers :

- (a) Vice-Chief of Army Staff
Lt Gen K S Katoch MC
Lt Gen J K Puri PVSM, AVSM

— Two

(b) Army Commander — Three

Lt Gen K Chiman Singh PVSM

Lt Gen Ranjit Singh Dyal PVSM, MVC**

Lt Gen J K Puri PVSM, AVSM

and

in the last seven years, ten Brigadiers have become Major Generals.

On the civil side, the record is equally impressive—

(a) Brigadier T Sailo, former Chief Minister of Mizoram was Commandant of 4 Assam Rifles and later 6 Assam Rifles.

(b) Padma Shree/Major B Khating, MBE, MC of 2 Assam Rifles held a diplomatic assignment as India's Ambassador to Burma.

(c) Lt Col (later Brigadier) Ram Singh Ahlawat, who became Speaker of Haryana Legislative Assembly, was once Staff Officer at the Directorate General of Assam Rifles.

(d) Late Major Hmingliana of 1 Assam Rifles became Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.

(e) Late Captain Haliday of 1 Assam Rifles became Secretary to the Government of Nagaland.

(f) Lt Colonel Yusuf Ali, who retired as Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, was Commandant 4 Assam Rifles.

Its ethos can be best summed up in the two following quotations. The first is from the book : "A Philosophy for NEFA" written by Dr Verrier Elwin who was Adviser to the Governor of Assam :—

"The custodians of law and order, the pioneers of every advance into the interior, the guardians of our borders and above all, the friends of the hill people".

The second is from Preface written by Field Marshal Lord Wavell to the book : "Forgotten Frontier" by Jeffery Tyson :—

".....disciplined soldiers such as those of the Assam Rifles who have such a fine record in the war".

Colonel J.B.P. Angwin

(MACGREGOR MEDAL RECIPIENT—1936)

J.A.F. DALAL



JAMES Baden Penrose Angwin was born on the 25th September 1900. Commissioned in the Royal Engineers on the 18th December 1919, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant in December 1921.

After joining the Survey of India at Dehra Dun in October 1924, he was transferred to the Frontier Circle in October 1925, where he remained for about 3 years till he went on leave ex-India in July 1928.

Returning from leave in September 1928, Lieutenant Angwin, as he then was, served in the Eastern Circle at Shillong in No. 4 Party. He was promoted to Captain in December 1930 and was confirmed as a Superintendent in the Survey of India in May 1931.

He held command of "E" company in the Frontier Circle from March 1932 to October 1933 when he again proceeded on leave ex-India. On return to India in November 1934, he held charge of No. 5 party at Shillong for about a year.

On the formation of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Party in November 1935, he worked under the orders of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Commission, who had the task of demarcating the Frontier between China and Burma in the neighbourhood of the Wa States. He was placed in charge of this demarcation till the Party was disbanded in July 1937. During this period he was responsible for the survey of a large area of then unknown country and was awarded the coveted MacGregor Medal in 1936. In recognition of his services to the Commission, he was awarded a well deserved M.B.E. (Member of the Order of the British Empire).

From August 1937 to August 1940 he was again posted to the Frontier Circle holding the charge of "A" Company as well as that

of Assistant Director Frontier Circle (Military). He was promoted to Major from 1st August 1938.

In August 1940 his services were temporarily placed at the disposal of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief when he was largely responsible for the raising of No. 1 Field Survey Company R.I.E., the first Indian Field Survey Company to be formed during World War II. In the spring of 1941 Lieutenant Colonel Angwin proceeded overseas as A.D. Survey to the force British Troops in Iraq—afterwards Tenth Army. Till mid 1942, he served in Persia and Iraq and was posted back to India thereafter. During the rest of the war he held appointments as A.D. Survey and D.D. Survey (Colonel) in Eastern and Southern Armies in India, and with South-East Asia Command (SEAC).

For his work in Persia and Iraq he was mentioned in dispatches. He was promoted to substantive Lieutenant Colonel in October 1945 and substantive full Colonel in April 1946.

At the end of the war on reversion to civil employment in the Survey of India in December 1945, he was appointed officiating Director, being confirmed in August 1946. As Director he held for short periods the posts of Deputy Surveyor General, Director, Geodetic Branch and Director, Map Publication and finally again Deputy Surveyor General in December 1946 from where he proceeded on leave on 1st March 1947. After Partition and with the introduction of constitutional changes in August 1947 his leave was converted into leave preparatory to retirement.

Colonel Angwin was an extremely conscientious and hard working officer and had great determination. I, as a Captain, used to see him, accompanied by his wife, working long hours in the office and finding minor mistakes even in War time Part II orders! In his younger days he had boundless physical energy and soon gained a reputation as a very fine Topographical Survey Officer. The success of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Party was largely due to his personal efforts in face of very severe difficulties. He had considerable powers of leadership and had the gift of soon inspiring the confidence and liking of those with whom he worked. He could have served on in India after partition on contract as some other British Officers did, but he decided to retire largely due to family considerations. This was a great blow to the Survey of India where his abilities as an

administrator would have had full scope in dealing with the many new problems confronting the Department.

After some time in England, he went to America and spent quite a few years in Columbus, Ohio, where he found the country "genial but for the most part unexciting". The people "universally friendly". He ran the "Cartographic group of the Mapping and Charting Research Laboratory, administered by the Ohio State University Research Foundation..... The laboratory works on research contracts, chiefly for Government Departments....." His group worked mainly "on the experimental development of various ideas aimed at improvement of aeronautical charts and special forms of charting".

About this work he said :

"It is highly fascinating; I think some of the ideas are good although I do not lay claim to many of them, or indeed any of the more iconoclastic, and I believe we are getting somewhere with them. In view of our own good rules and practices in the Department, it may be felt by some that I am trying to paint the lily but, in fact the more we do, the more I find there is that need to be done, and I am sure, can be done. I have a very small staff...and all have been trained from scratch in the Group. They are all Research Assistants rather than draftsmen but we all turn our hands to anything and I myself function in Departmental terms of anything from duft to S.G.....You can see why it is fun".

He returned from U.S.A. in 1959 and then was very busy as Congress Director for the International Photogrammetric Congress held in London in 1960.

Then in retirement in Cornwall, he reared pigs, hens and rabbits in turn; he also kept open house for any Survey of India officer, specially those whom he knew. He enjoyed meeting them, only not enough people could get to where he stayed.

Some time in 1967 he suggested that the Survey of India Reunion (A society consisting of all who were members of the Survey of India before 15th August 1947) might establish a fund to cover the expenses of preparing and publishing a single readable volume covering the last century of the British connection from where Colonel Phillimore left off, i.e. from 1861. Had Colonel Angwin been alive it would have

been heartening for him to note that his idea has germinated with some variation in that the Government of India have ordered an Abridged History of the department from 1767-1972 to be prepared. The project is in progress.

Pen Angwin died on 5th May 1970, a man held in affection by all who knew or had the privilege of serving with him.

I visited his son, Colin, in England last year. I asked him what specially appealed to him about his father. Colin replied that it was his adaptability. Having held all along an important position, it was amazing how he worked after retirement at any job. Truly he was "anything from duftry to S.G. (Surveyor General)."

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

I

Dear Sir,

I am fascinated to read in the U.S.I. Journal of December '86 a review of the "Soviet Union—a geographic survey". Why must all English and American pro-present-order people have to distort true facts to represent the U.S.S.R. as a flop? Would the truth hurt anyone? I would say that this continuous and oft purposeless distortion helps to deceive one's reader and oneself only, while the river of truth flows on to emerge in time to reveal what was the reality. I therefore wonder why we so easily swallow non-truths as positive facts.

Take for instance the actual fact that 10% of the U.S.S.R. remains under permafrost. How much of the total Soviet Union can produce two crops? The answer is clear in one glance, at its most southerly latitude, scarcely 1% will permit growing of more than one crop. To say, then, that because they have collective farming is why their production is short of target is rather like wanting a division to release its battalions on to an objective by 'making their way to it under their own power and plans, rather than in a properly organised way.

The enormous progress made by the U.S.S.R. can only be judged by the fact that it was able to sustain itself during World War II and thereafter. But the pace of meat production and animal husbandary has to be kept to plan. Therefore Agriculture is better served by growing everything required for man's need and buying much of what is needed for animal industry etc. Even under the most extreme cold, permafrost and having to develop desolate areas the U.S.S.R. produces some percentage short of one ton per capita of population! If that is a "disadvantage" of collectives then let us take an even more clear contrast, at home.

We in India cultivate about 7 million hectares of land *more* than does China. But China's collectives produce nearly 400 million tons of grain while our tractor-served and higher tech farming, when it produces 150 million tons, we go into raptures.

The very logic of organized against unorganized functioning is in favour of the former. Henry Ford anticipating socialist methods, proved this organized mass production which devastated free group products and forced them to close down. Melvyn How's reviewer should be asked to remember that America sells its produce, not because the home need is fulfilled, but because many people cannot afford to buy at the prices asked. While the U.S.S.R. and other countries buy at the asked prices to feed the animals which in time are used and consumed by the Soviet people. The Ukraine is still the main granery of the U.S.S.R. and is producing many hundred percent more than it formerly did. While the people are all fed, there is no ostentatious living. True, if the world was at real peace, the pace of advance in the U.S.S.R. would have been many fold greater; but even now it is growing more rapidly than the other world together with its allies.

—Maj Gen E. Habibullah
(Retd)

II

Dear Sir,

Major (Dr) D. B. Sharma, AEC in his article 'The Mazhbi Sikh Soldier' printed in the October-December 1986 issue of the USI Journal states on page 346 in para 3 "The men were prematurely retired or transferred to the new units of Sappers and Miners which were replacing the technologically obsolete pioneers". The Sappers and Miners units were not new but were in fact older than the Sikh pioneers, who were raised after 1857. The official raising dates of the three groups of the Sappers and Miners are :

Queen Victoria's own Madras Sappers and Miners—1780	
King George V's own Bengal Sappers and Miners —1803	
The Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners	—1820

What is even more galling is his statement on page 347 that "they (the Mazhbi Sikhs) were made an object of ridicule by being asked to go to Sappers and Miners. Needless to say it was an improper recognition of their aspirations". The author thereby implies that it was some kind of disgrace to be sent to the Sappers and Miners. Nothing can be further from the truth. The fact is that the majority of the Sikh Pioneers were not found technically qualified to join the Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners although quite a few were taken, and the entire Sikh Pioneer Band was transferred to the Royal

Bombay Sappers and Miners in 1933. At the present moment, about half the strength of the Bombay Engineer Group comprise of Mazhbi and Ramdasia Sikhs.

Where does the question of 'ridicule' come in? As a Bombay Sapper, I can quote some fact's. They have won 36 Battle and 30 Theatre Honours. The first Victoria cross in the Second World War was won by 2/Lt Premindra Singh Bhagat of the Bombay Sappers in Abyssinia in January 1941. The Param Vir Chakra was won by 2/Lt R. R. Rane in Jammu and Kashmir operations in April 1948, and the Ashok Chakra posthumously by Nb/Subedar Gurnam Singh in September 1973, when he sacrificed his life to save the lives of the men under him, when a charge line mine clearing exploded during a demonstration. The Bombay Sappers have thus won the two highest awards for gallantry of independent India, the Param Vir Chakra and Ashok Chakra, apart from that most famous decoration for valour, the Victoria Cross during the British period (Apart from Gen Bhagat, two British officers had won the VC during the Victorian era).

I am only talking about the Bombay Sappers; the other two groups have also covered themselves with glory both during war and peace.

The latest memorable achievement of the Sappers was that the entire crew of the yacht TRISHNA which sailed around the world covering a distance of 50,000 km were all Sapper Officers. They have been pioneers in many a field; mountaineering, gliding, hang-gliding and of course sailing.

The sappers have a charisma of their own, and quite a few gentlemen cadets passing out high in the order of merit from the Indian Military Academy opt for the Sappers including some who have won the Sword of Honour. This was the case even before India became independent.

I can do no better than quote the late Lieutenant General P. S. Bhagat PVSM, VC who was Colonel Commandant of the Bombay Sappers and Colonel of the Sikh Light Infantry at the same time, when he once said before a gathering of officers in the College of Military Engineering "One thing I can proudly state is that I am a Bombay Sapper. Not all can have the same luck".

—Major General R. M. RAU
AVSM (Retd)

Book Reviews

Review Article

FROM H-BOMB TO STAR WARS : THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING.

BY JONATHAN B. STEIN.

(Lexington Books Lexington, Mass, Toronto, December 1984: pp 118; \$ 28.00)

‘THE pace of technological development and industrialisation made the unleashing of the atom only a matter of time’ and ‘Prometheus is for ever unbound’ observes Robert E Hunter in his foreword to this interesting and sober volume of Jonathan Stein.

The author, to begin with poses the question, ‘Does politics drive technology or does technological innovation determine (or foreclose) political choice in the initiation and solidification of the armaments race ?’ Stein’s thesis, amply supported by the observations of strategists and weapon producers is that in this, as in several other areas concerning public life in the world of today, politics is in command. Hence political assessments and plans trigger the quest for new weapons which in turn lead to technological innovations in weapon development and production.

This view of Stein is endorsed by the most eminent strategists of today. Albert Wohlstetter in his article “Strategy and Natural Scientists” notes that “technology is an important part, but very far from the whole of strategy”. Kissinger’s considered view has been that “development and use of weapon systems are impossible without strategic doctrine”. These views are fully validated by the events starting from the development and first use of the atomic weapon in 1945, to the development of the H-Bomb and the present efforts on America’s part to build and deploy space weapon (or Star Wars) systems.

The actual decision to produce the hydrogen bomb or the 'super' weapon as it was referred to by American scientists and planners at the time, was taken almost immediately after the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in September 1949. On September 23, President Truman on hearing about the Soviet test noted soberly that.

"We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected".

Truman was far from being a war monger; was a liberal in domestic politics but strongly anti-Soviet. He fervently believed that USA's military supremacy must remain unchallenged and unchallengeable in order to maintain peace in the world and retain West Europe on America's side. His advisers, especially Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Atomic Energy Commissioner, Lewis Strauss, were 'hawks, as were predictably, the Service Chiefs.

At a session of the JCAE (Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) held a week after the Soviet test, Lewis Strauss in his testimony stated that following the Soviet test, (code named JOE 1, by the Pentagon) USA was on the defensive and urged that "*we regain the absolute advantage*". (emphasis added)

There were powerful voices in the US Congress as well as among conservative elements outside, that favoured the development of the Super in order that USA stayed far ahead of the Soviet Union in strategic weaponry.

It was not that there weren't any sober voices in USA advocating restraint. Indeed there were; but those in authority ignored their cogent arguments. The GAC, General Advisory Committee, consisting of eleven members including the Secretary of State, service chiefs and scientists was against the 'Super' weapon. Only two, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and Atomic Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss were in favour, but the minority decision prevailed.

Even within the State Department, there were thinkers who advised caution and mustered cogent arguments against chasing the mirage of attaining supremacy in nuclear weapons. George Kennan,

who as America's Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1945 had sent his famous telegram urging 'containment' of the Soviet Union, was one such level headed thinker who time and again drew the attention of his masters to the futility of the quest for newer and more powerful weapons of mass destruction.

Few would now remember that as early as May 1945 when the A bomb was in the final stages of development, Oppenheimer, in the presence of Fermi, Arthur Compton and Lawrence who were all working on the Manhattan project (A Bomb) had stated that the super weapon was considered to be feasible, through "a far more difficult development than the previous stages" (of producing fissile material, assembling it properly and developing a workable fission weapon).

Immediately after the Soviet test of 1949, however, President Truman gave his unqualified support to the development of the 'Super' so that US re-established its massive lead over the Soviet Union. This approach of Truman and his supporters leads Stein to the logical conclusion that "the determinants of the Soviet-US arms race must be considered political in nature..... A rivalry as great as the nuclear arms race may well be fed by technological advances, but its inspiration can only be drawn from the failures inherent in political vision."

To Edward Teller, the father of America's H-Bomb project, however, the development of the Super is not part of the arms race but rather the race in technology". The former emphasises the quantity of arms, the latter their quality and particularly the element of novelty". This certainly was his individual approach as a technocrat but the basics of the arms race is certainly political.

Teller produced a huge contraption which in fact was a large fission weapon whose explosion triggered the fusion of a kilogram of tritium (the heaviest form of hydrogen H_3). Teller's device thus was not the hydrogen bomb of later years developed by the two super powers but a fission-fusion weapon which weighed 'hundred of tons', yielded an estimated 15 mega tons of explosive energy and obliterated the island of Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean when it was dropped by American aircraft.

The H Bomb is now an essential constituent of the strategic forces of USA, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France. It is

not unlikely that Israel too has some compact H weapons. Pakistan's Abdul Qadir has bluntly stated that developing a H-Bomb is not beyond Pakistan's capability.

Although Stein has not discussed them, secondary arms races represented by the growth of declared and undeclared nuclear powers too, have been triggered by political considerations.

The post H bomb era also provides enough evidence to support Stein's theory of politics setting the pace of induction of new technologies into weapon development. America has been the pace setter because of its obsession with non existent or highly exaggerated Soviet threats and its self hypnotised conviction that it will be secure only if it has unchallengeable military superiority over its rival, the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the global arms race which shows no sign of abating, the threats to the security and integrity of non-aligned and other small states and growing regional tensions are all due to America's policies and actions for maintaining overwhelming military supremacy over the Soviet Union and indeed over any combination of countries of the world.

Because of this obsession, USA first developed the H bomb, then ICBMs, 'mirved' them, introduced new SLBMs and subsequently the cruise missiles. All the while it has been tightening its ring around the Soviet Union by recruiting regional surrogates prepared to adopt anti-Soviet Policies for adequate consideration. Since 1983, the quest for absolute and unchallengeable military superiority has taken USA into space, because of the conviction that whoever controls the space above, controls the earth below.

It was in March 1983 that President Reagan authorised the Star Wars (or strategic Defence Initiative) project following some breakthroughs in laser and particle beam technologies achieved by scientists of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories.

President Reagan was convinced by early 1983 that space weapons can be developed and deployed. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger has been an ardent advocate of the Star Wars Programme. He noted in his Defence Report for 1983 us under :—

"To support an anti-Satellite capability beyond this decade, we are currently assessing the feasibility of space based laser weapons. The programme is structured to sustain our understanding of this technology so that we can field an advanced and highly effective BMD system quickly should the need arise".

General Daniel O Graham, of the Heritage Foundation, an ultra right wing organisation, in his book 'High Frontier' has explained his concept of ballistic missile defence (BMD). This envisages the positioning of anti-BM systems in space and on the ground in order that an enemy missile once launched may be destroyed during :

- (i) the boost phase i.e. as soon as missile is launched and is moving comparatively slowly and is close to the earth;
- (ii) while it is cruising on its trajectory and is somewhere in mid course; and
- (iii) in the terminal phase as the missile is closing in on its target.

Boost phase interception is to be preferred. Mid-course interception has several snags, especially when enemy launches a number of missiles and missile warheads carry and discard decoys as they move along their trajectories. Terminal interception has its advantages as well as hazards. USA has successfully tested terminal phase interception in 1985 using missiles with HE warheads launched from its F-15 fighter aircraft. The risk is that should a cluster of enemy missiles be launched, defenders may not be able to intercept all the incoming warheads; and if two out of twenty get through, unacceptable damage may be caused to one's cities, population and industries.

According to Graham, his High Frontier strategy converts the doctrine of MAD, mutual assured destruction, into assured survival, because it eliminates enemy weapons while safeguarding one's own. Hence the enemy will be in no position to threaten you while you will have all your weapons intact, assuring your pre-eminence.

However, an effective space weapons system is likely to be extremely complex, expensive to produce and sustain and would need considerable time and R&D effort to bring into being.

First, particle or laser beams can be effective as interceptors of coming missiles, only if they are launched from orbiting space vehicles, with energies of over 100 MeV (million electron Volts). Such energies, in turn, can only be generated by very large space based accelerators and multi-mega watt power sources. Despite all this, the beams once launched, suffer loss of energy as they travel. Laser beams would be attenuated as they travel and particle beams would be deflected by earth's magnetic field.

Second, several hundred orbiting satellites must be put in position (at least 400, according to Graham) with about 20,000 conventionally armed 'kill' vehicles to be launched from space platforms.

In order to hoist this number of orbiting satellites, it is estimated that at least 14000 shuttle flights would be necessary just to carry basic equipment into space to build the needed launch platforms and power stations. USA's space programme, as of now, envisages the launching of about 400 shuttle flights up to the end of 1992. Hence it would be sometime before Reagan's space weapon platforms are in position.

This is some consolation, especially to the poor and the non aligned of this world. The real cause for concern, "star Wars" or no star wars and no high frontier technologies, is that the tempo of American arms build up has not slowed down despite some budget cuts. Further, its nuclear doctrines are still based on retaining overwhelming weapon supremacy. USA as noted earlier systematically understates the size of its own weapon arsenals while exaggerating that of its rival. Finally USA's policy is to use nuclear weapons in war, declared or undeclared, to attain its ends. Such use is most likely to be against a non-nuclear state which does not wish to be USA's satellite.

The first has been amply proved by the many instances quoted by Stein. The second has been equally clear to students of contemporary affairs. As the eminent American statesman and former Defence Secretary Robert McNamara has noted "we in the USA consistently understate our own capability and overstate USSR's capability."

"We created the perception of the 'Window' of Vulnerability'. I have never heard such absolute rot". (From McNamara's address

to Canada's Parliament, as reported in *Statesman*, October 27, 1983). There is a method in this madness. By repeatedly under estimating the size of American arsenal while highly overstating the other side's the American public would be less inclined to oppose defence spending most of which is known to be unnecessary and the gullible in the third world would believe that USA is merely trying to defend itself.

Finally, USA's nuclear doctrine. This is based on the first use of nuclear weapons, and has been in force ever since USA produced these weapons and deployed them. It is still in force as noted in the Memorandum attached to Defence Secretary Weinberger's "Fiscal Year 1985-89 defence guidance" document. This frankly notes that "The possible use of nuclear weapons remains a key element of our overall deterrent strategy".

It is with the help of this nuclear doctrine that USA intends keeping the world—especially the non-aligned third world—its hostage.

COL. R. RAMA RAO (RETD.)

THE SOVIET POLITY IN THE MODERN ERA.

EDITED BY ERIK P HOFFMANN AND ROBBIN F LAIRD

Published by the Aldine Publishing Company New York, (1984)
942pp., \$24.95 (Paper) \$49.95 (cloth).

THE book is a collection of major Western writings on the most important elements of contemporary Soviet politics and society. There are a total of 36 such articles, some of which are reproduced while others are in the original. They are grouped under four main headings, namely; the historical roots; leadership and administration; the economy and society; continuity and change. The book comprises of nearly 950 pages and each article is followed by copious references for further study since it is in fact designed for graduate and undergraduate courses on comparative politics in US universities. The writers are from the West or those who have previously been Soviet citizens. In spite of the difficulty of making assessments about a closed society where direct observation is restricted the writers have made a thorough analysis of their subjects.

In view of the current thought in official US circles that the USSR is Anti Christ the study as such is a very balanced assessment about the Soviet Union.

Many of the defects and shortcomings in the USSR could be found in other parts of the world and not necessarily restricted to communist governments. Some mention is made for example for the need to open the economy for private enterprise, free from controls. In reality there is no country where such an economy exists. Political and financial expediency dictates the necessity for some form of controls. To take agricultural sector in the USA there would be no need for it to receive the attention it gets if it were not for political purposes. Similarly there is the supposedly inordinate authority that the bureaucracy wields in the Soviet Union. Both in the USA and in Britain the bureaucracy does not necessarily follow the dictates of the political masters. They can delay and subvert any measure which they do not agree with. In fact their permanence at the seats of power as compared to the nomadic politician gives them an inbuilt advantage.

It is interesting to note that the real power is wielded by the person who controls the system of cadre selection. Since the days of Stalin the Secretary has held this important portfolio. Even in the Congress party in India Mr Nehru realised that he could only control the government if he had unrestricted command of the selection process within it. This is somewhat contrary to the 'old boy' net which seems to be the practice in the British system especially in the Conservative Party.

The problems of centralised planning, the need for modernisation and the tussles between the bureaucrat and the technologist are well covered. Similar situations prevail in India as well. In both countries increasing industrialisation is leading to conflict between those who want faster progress and those who see change as a threat to their existence.

The book necessarily makes for heavy reading and it would be impossible to browse through it. On the other hand if only from the point of view of comparison with India's problems it is most interesting. Except for minor variations it is an objective study of the problems that the USSR faces. It also tries to foresee the way that solutions to these problems may be found. As in the case of

most countries radical departures from established procedures is unlikely. This is aptly summed up at the end of the book.

The book is an excellent beginning for serious students of the Soviet Union.

MAJ GEN SATINDER SINGH (RETD)

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

BY WILLIAM T LEE AND RICHARD F STAAR

Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1986, 263 pp, \$21.95

THIS interesting publication has been jointly authored by two knowledgeable persons—W T Lee, formerly of CIA and later staff member of the Defense Intelligence Agency of U.S.A., and R. F. Staar, formerly U. S. ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna and later Senior Fellow and Coordinator of International Studies Programme at the Hoover Institution. The authors have reportedly based their analysis of Soviet military policy almost exclusively on original Russian language material. The publication has been foreworded by W.R. Van Cleave, Director, Defence and Strategic Studies Programme, University of Southern California, who has pointed out one omission from the book, “namely, the current “debate” over whether USSR doctrine for theatre warfare (specifically, NATO Europe) has shifted from a nuclear to a conventional emphasis. For understandable (if not persuasive) reasons, there is a strong movement today in favour of a new conventional-emphasis posture for NATO, putatively to provide a defense that will “raise the nuclear threshold.” Since obviously NATO has control over only its own threshold of nuclear use, and not the Soviet one, it is necessary to argue that USSR theatre doctrine now also has a conventional emphasis and that in the event of war in Europe the Soviet goal would also be to raise and observe the nuclear threshold.”

The book contains 46 useful tables on Soviet weapon systems and procurements, an exhaustive bibliography, and an Index. USSR-watchers, especially defence experts and military strategists, will, no doubt find this book extremely educative and informative.

B. CHAKRAVORTY

THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL 1984

BY STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SOLNA,
SWEDEN

Distributed by Taylor and Francis, 1984, 208 pp. £4.95

IN the decade since Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI) was constituted to commemorate Swedens 150 years of 'unbroken peace' it has earned the distinction of being one of the most respected commentator and recorder of facts about the world's—especially the Super Powers and its allies—preoccupation with armaments. The reason for SIPRI's success is not only on account of the excellence of its research and its packaging but, more important, because it has by and large presented both facts and analysis with minimal prejudice due to the ceaseless East-West acrimonies. SIPRI objectivity is all the more remarkable when one considers by way of contrast the unabashed bias in the great many strategic study 'fast books' that emanate from West, especially the United States, where most research and its product has unashamedly veered to the right since the coming of the Reagan Administration and the so-called conservation revolution. Even the English equivalent of SIPRI, the vastly influential International Institute of Strategic Studies, IISS, is not quite free from such stigma.

Although the SIPRI publishes a number of books on strategic issues each year, its most influential publication, and on which much of its reputation is based, is the *World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook*, a heavy, thick (pp. 700-800) expensive (£ 28) compendium of facts and analysis which no self respecting scholar or library has been able to do without. Yet its sales beyond the Library circuit could not have been much in view of the prohibitive price of the book. To push sales, i.e., to make money, in 1981 it decided to reach out to a wider audience, by publishing the *Shorter SIPRI Yearbook* which is generally one third the size of the original and, what is no doubt more important for many, at one fifth of its price. The Shorter Yearbook, notwithstanding the title is not an abridged version. The shortness is achieved by exclusion. For instance the 1984 Shorter SIPRI Year Book has 9 chapters in comparison to 19 in the thicker original. Much data and many of best articles in original, on issues such as Chemical Warfare, Nicaragua-Honduras (US) conflict have been scarified, although like the original thicker

version it continues to be divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Issues, in which is catalogued the considerable nuclear armament programmes that are underway. Part II focuses on world armament, i.e., on the major producers, consumers and exporters of arms. Part III contains an account of the major arms control negotiations pursued during the year.

From a third world—Indian perspective—the weakness of SIPRI Yearbooks, both the bigger and the shorter versions is its Eurocentric, Super Power, Nuclear Weapon focus. For instance, in the entire shorter version, issues relevant to the third world are shrugged off by brief mentions covering not more than ten pages. The furious arms race in the subcontinent, for instance, is dismissed by a brief discussion of two pages. These pages however are interesting. They clearly suggest that India is not as innocent a bystander in the buying of the latest, and invariably the more expensive weapon systems that are available, as many Indians would like to imagine.

Although the Shorter SIPRI Year Book is quite clearly dated as two more thicker and shorter ones have since been published, yet it is useful as handy reference book and for its provocative and thoughtful articles.

MAJOR VIJAY TIWATHIA

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's.

ED BY ROY GODSON.

Number I : Elements of Intelligence 1983, 148 pp.

Number II : Analysis and Estimates 1980, 223 pp.

Number III : Counter intelligence 1980, 339 pp.

Number IV : Covert Action, 1981, 243 pp.

Number V : Clandestine collection, 1982, 232 pp.

Published by National Strategy Information Center. Inc. Washington DC 20036. Distributed by Transaction Books. New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK). Price not mentioned.

THE above mentioned five volumes on the intelligence requirements for the 1980s are the result of efforts of a group of social scientists

from different academic institutions which formed a Consortium in the Study of Intelligence in April 1979. Its membership included political scientists, particularly specialists in international relations and US foreign policy, historians, sociologists and Professors of international law. The purpose of this group of social scientists was to study objectively the intelligence processes and products and to examine their relationship to US decision-making. The main thrust of these papers, included in the five volumes, was to determine what steps be taken to improve the US performance and also to ensure that US performance enhances American values.

The first volume entitled 'Elements of Intelligence' is infact an introduction to the succeeding four volumes of the series. In this volume, the issues and problems are defined which are dealt exhaustively later on. Roy Godson gives an introduction in the beginning. He describes the term 'Intelligence' in the American context. According to him it connotes information needed or desired by the government in pursuance of its national interest, and it includes a process of obtaining, following, protecting and eventually exploiting the same information. He also points out that intelligence protects the US institutions from penetration and harm by hostile intelligence services. Then he describes the major four divisions of intelligence eg. Analysis, Collection, Counter Intelligence and Covert Actions. He also describes that success in any one of the four is related to success in others.

The second chapter in this volume is written by Lt. Gen. D.O. Graham, US Army. He served as the senior official in Army Offices and Defence Intelligence Agency. In his essay he supports the concept of competitive analysis. He points out that inaccuracy in intelligence is due to the fact that alternative views do not reach to the policy-makers. Chapter two of this volume deals with clandestine collection and was written by a specialist Samuel Halpern. He had served in the Office of Strategic Services during the World War II and Strategic Services Unit before he joined CIA. He, in his essay, maintains with the legal and organisational arrangements settled in 1947 which have given powers for collection of intelligence and covert action to the CIA, are the most effective. Chapter 3 dealing with the counter intelligence is written by N.S. Miller a specialist in counter intelligence who served in CIA. He points out that re-organisation is necessary to meet the requirements of US intelligence

in 1980s. He suggests measures to be taken in this direction particularly on coordination between different agencies. The 4th chapter which deals with covert operations is written by Huk Tavor who also served on several posts in CIA. In his essay he laments that the action capabilities had considerably been reduced during 1970s. He points out the importance of covert action as an instrument of foreign policy and suggests a possible framework for action, to regain the whole initiative. He also points out reasons for success of some operations and the failure of others. The 5th chapter deals with reforms and proposals and is written by a professional staff member of Senate Intelligence Committee, Dr. Angelo Codevilla. He covers various attempts to legislate structural changes in the intelligence community. He points out that executive branch of the Congress had not taken necessary steps to ensure adequacy of the requirements of the 1980s. He also points out that the actual requirements for American Intelligence 1980s are being set by the US enemies. Therefore, he emphasises that those who are responsible for making changes in the organisation of US intelligence machinery must take this point in view. He also desired that the re-organisation of intelligence system should be left into the hands of the nation's elected officials and senior appointed officers.

The other four volumes deal with the topics mentioned above. They include papers from several specialists. The main theme of these volumes is to project the kind of intelligence that would be required by the US Govt. and how the process of collection and analysis should be reorganised to meet the requirements.

These volumes are extremely useful for three reasons. First, they project the flaws in the intelligence system and give recommendations for the removal of shortcomings. Secondly, they project the likely requirements of the U.S. Govt. not only in 1980s but in foreseeable future. Thirdly, they point out that the matter which has so far been subjected to extreme secrecy, can be usefully discussed openly and objective assessment can be made.

The language used in these volumes is extremely good. The matter has been presented in a lucid style. These volumes are highly recommended for all those who are concerned with the study and research in intelligence and international relations.

—S.D. PRADHAN

GULF SECURITY INTO THE 1980S: PERCEPTUAL AND STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS

ED. BY ROBERT G. DARIUS AND OTHERS.

Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
1984, 134 pp. \$ 21.95 (cloth) \$ 10.95 (Paper).

IN the modern times the Persian Gulf has been a contest area among the major powers, first among the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Iranians, the Arabs and the Turks in the 17th century over trade, next in the 18th century with Britain as an additional contender over trade and imperial communication, and later in the 19th century for the strategic location of the Gulf, i.e. its proximity to India. However, since the discovery of oil in this area in 1908, this liquid 'gold' has overshadowed other considerations in shaping the Gulf's role in world affairs. In 1937, the independent states of the region - Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey made the Sadabad Pact to maintain their influence against regional and distant threats. The British hegemony over the Gulf region was given up in 1971. Consequently, USA tried to maintain through the Nixon Doctrine the security of the region with the help of the states of the region, mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia. But that plan failed with the collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1979.

Analysing the multiple dimensions of Gulf politics and security R.G. Darius says that the 'Iranian Revolution', the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the Carter Doctrine, and the development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) exemplify the range of internal, regional and extra-regional elements that will influence Gulf security in the 1980s. "The convoluted and fluid situation in the Gulf area defies simple solutions," he observes. While Arab leaders view the most pressing and immediate threat mainly from the spillover of the Arab-Israeli or Iraqi-Iranian disputes, Iranian leaders see the principal threat to Gulf security through super-power intervention and the illegitimacy of the pro-Western rulers of the Conservative Gulf regimes as they are the key internal source of domestic instability. The abortive U.S.-Israeli cooperation agreement, the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon have raised doubts in Arab minds about the real U.S. intention in the Gulf area. The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the Gulf War between Iraq

and Iran, the U.S. effort to ensure Gulf security unilaterally through the RDJTF, and Khomeini's intention to export Islamic revolution to Gulf States have all combined to expand ties between Iraq on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and other conservative states of the area on the other. The Gulf Cooperation Council (set up in 1981) led by Saudi Arabia, with the exclusion of Iran and Iraq, has been created with the aim of ensuring their own internal security through joint efforts without seeking outside help. As regards Iran, her leaders see USA as the main cause of the Gulf War, the Kurd problem, and other domestic upheavals in Iran. The American effort to defend the Gulf through the RDJTF and the deployment and ultimate sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. support to the GCC are considered unfriendly acts by Iran. As a result, the U.S. finds itself between the horns of a dilemma. If it gets closer to the conservative Arab states to help defend them against the possible long-term Soviet threat and the short-term threat of the spillover of the Gulf War, Iran could be encouraged to move closer to Moscow: but if it fails to take steps to help the Arabs to defend themselves, it will lose its credibility as their super-power friend. Hence, USA's "role in this delicate situation has to be played in a low-key, calculated fashion".

The Editors have observed in the conclusion: "Barring a credible Western deterrent, a Soviet move to seize the oil of the Gulf is thus plausible. Indeed, the 1980s may well be the last decade in which four crucial elements are in the correct combination for Soviet strategists:

1. Current Gulf production is vital to the West, but not to the Soviets—meaning that a disruption could fatally tip the correlation of forces in favour of the Soviets;
2. Production could be restored, even after extensive disruption during combat operations or by deliberate destruction by retreating forces, in time for Gulf oil to be available to meet future Soviet needs;
3. The Gulf states are still suffering from the disruptions and distractions following the Iranian Islamic revolution, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has yet to establish itself as a major security factor;

4. The Western deterrent, in the form of the RDJTF, is still too underdeveloped to form a credible conventional deterrent."

"As MacDonald so ably points out, the initial U.S. policy response to Soviet Afghan moves was to create a deterrent force, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF; later reconstituted as the RDJTF), to counter Soviet military moves. The original idea here was to signal the Soviet Union that any further movement toward the Gulf, and in particular toward Gulf oil fields, would trigger a U.S. military response of unknown dimensions."

"The Middle East is one of the most difficult of all foreign policy environments. As an area of policy concern, the Middle East presents a combination of great uncertainty and great necessity uncertainty because the prevailing pattern of conflicts is both complicated and volatile; necessity because of the Middle East's central geographical location and because it is the repository of a very high percentage of world oil reserves."

This publication does not give a Soviet point of view about the Gulf security. It does not appear sensible that the Soviet Union will launch upon a plan to seize the Gulf oil or any of the Gulf territory. If USA stews in its own oil through contradictory pro-Arab and pro-Israeli policies, plus its traditional support to conservative Arab rulers' where is the need of the Soviet Union to burn its fingers by indulging in over active politico-military policy in the Gulf? Many of the premises of the authors are wrong and one-sided.

The book contains bibliographical notes as well as an Index.

It will be welcomed by all serious students of international politics.

B. CHAKRAVORTY

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR : AN HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS.

ED. BY M. S. ELAZHARY

Croom Helm, London and Sydney. 1984, 144pp, £17.95.

THE seven-year old Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, has been bedevilling peace in the Middle East, and threatening

to engulf other countries also. This interesting publication has focussed attention on the historical, economic and political dimensions of the war, including regional and world-wide implications. There is no doubt that it was Iraq that had started the war, and it was Iraq which showed willingness for peace when it came under severe military retribution at the Iranian hands. Now, it is mainly Khomeini's intransigence and rigid conditions that stand in the way of an honourable cease-fire. Khomeini's insistence on the removal of President Saddam Hussain from the helm of Iraq as the first condition for peace talks will never be acceptable to Saddam Hussain till he holds power in Iraq. Alternatively, peace talks between the two countries will be possible after the death of Khomeini. These two economically prosperous countries of the region are mutually destroying their economy and manpower over a prolonged, unnecessary war as a result of which the developed arms-supplying countries only are reaping the harvest.

Glen Balfour-Pal in the concluding Chapter has assessed the prospects for peace thus: "It depends on whether the 'real' and overarching objective of the current hostilities was and remains the achievement of hegemony in the region as a whole, all other basic aims being subsumed within it. If that view is correct—and it is the view to which the writer is inclined to subscribe—then the best hope is that Iraq and Iran, having used war to secure a settlement of the minor fundamental points at issue, will use peace and the blessings that go with it to advance their respective claims to regional influence—the earned product, as already stated, of a whole series of legitimate and civilizing factors."

This book will be welcome to all those who want to know thoroughly the problems surrounding the Iraq-Iran relationship.

B. CHAKRAVORTY

SUDAN : THREATS TO STABILITY

BY PETER WOODWORD

Published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 12/12A Golden Square, London, 1985, Pages 22. (Study No. 193). Price not mentioned.

THIS is a fairly comprehensive and concise study of the problem of internal conflict resulting in instability in the Sudan. It is a little

out of date as President Numeiri has since been ousted by a military coup.

The study covers the main aspects as they affect the Sudan. There are the ethnic and regional problems. Over and above this there is the economic difficulties that a largely agricultural country faces when it is under developed. International relations as they apply to the Sudan are discussed. These are associated with the neighbours *i. e.*, Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia and the Gulf States which lie just across the Red Sea. At the back loom the superpowers. In recent times the USA has been the most significant donor of aid. Geographically the Sudan is situated in close vicinity to the Marxist state of Ethiopia and the land of Gaddafi, that largely unpredictable Islamic/socialist leader intent on gaining influence and power at the expense of Egypt, the closest ally of the Sudanese state.

The Sudan is an example of a geographical entity so divided on ethnic grounds that it could only hold firm and united under foreign rule. While the Nile unites the whole country it is also the region where successive waves of Arab incursions pushed the indigenous inhabitants Southwards. Sudan lies astride the boundary between the Arabs to the North and the African Blacks to the South. While many of the Blacks in other parts of Africa have been incorporated in the Islamic fold this was denied in the Sudan where the British converted the Southern tribes to Christianity with a view to divide the country into different religious groups in order to counter the impact of the messianic effect of another Mahadi who might challenge British domination as the earlier one did in the time of General Gordon (in the late 19th Century).

It is possible to conclude from the study the fact that in many undeveloped countries democracy fails to take root owing to the propensity of politicians to cater more for personal ambitions and wealth than for any sense of patriotism. This leads to divisiveness of such a nature that the only cohesive force the Army, takes over. While it is welcome in the earlier stages, familiarity on both sides, that is between the civilian and the military, leads to disillusionment. Once entrenched the Army refuses to let go of power. And the worst in this case is the fact that the Army leader who usurped power refuses to surrender it. Change then comes via another coup from within the armed forces. This is what has

happened in the Sudan and is the common way of life in other military dictatorships such as Pakistan.

A well written study on the problems stability as they affect the Sudan. As stated earlier the study will have to be updated to account for recent changes in the Sudan.

MAJ GEN SATINDER SINGH (RETD)

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR

BY GIULIO DOUHET, TRANSLATED BY DINO FERRARI

Office of Air Force History Washington, D.C., 1983, 394 pp, \$8.00

THE book which could, in many respects, be called the 'Bible' of Air Power has been reprinted by the Office of the US Air Force to provide an historical background to the study of Air Power. In fact, the present volume is a compilation of four books, the first being a revised (1927) edition of Douhet's original classic. Books II and IV describe the probable aspects of a future war, while Book III is a recapitulation of air power doctrine as presented in Book I.

Giulio Douhet, born in Caserta in 1869 and commissioned into the Italian Army in Artillery in 1882 was a prominent Italian thinker soldier and writer. He was, perhaps, the first high-ranking military officer to think seriously about the impact of aircraft and application of Air Power on warfare. He commanded one of the first army-air units and directed the army's Aviation Section. When the Italian Army became locked in a bloody combat resulting in a stalemate with Austria, Douhet proposed an aerial bombing campaign directed against the morale of the population, thus forcing the enemy to capitulate. His ideas, however, were rejected and he was court-martialled and imprisoned for a year for criticising his superiors. In 1918 he was recalled to service and promoted to General Officer in 1921, when he published his now famous book 'Command of The Air'. Soon after he retired from the service.

The book highlights Douhet's firm belief that the primary role of the Air Power was to "attain the 'Command of the Air'—that is, to put the enemy in a position where he is unable to fly, while preserving for oneself the ability to do so". Douhet believed that the best method to achieve the objective of the 'Command of the

Air' was to adopt an offensive strategy for which the Air Power was most suited because of its inherent characteristics of surprise, concentration and firepower. The enemy Air power had to be attacked and destroyed on the ground, by using own aircraft in an offensive role. For this purpose, the Air Force had to be so organised that it was independent of Army and Navy and it could carry out its primary role without any outside interference. "The Air Force should at all times co-operate with the Army and Navy, but it must be independent of them both", he said.

Douhet's thinking on Air Power had a tremendous impact on air doctrine and organisation of Air Forces during the period between the First and the Second World Wars. He stated the case for Air power as no one else did. His thoughts on Air Power are actually more valid today than they were during his lifetime.

Some of what he wrote today seem almost timeless, "Principles". Perhaps, of the employment of aircraft in war, Giulio Douhet was a prophet. From the perspective of today, he still bears pondering. Serious thinking about the nature of war and the role of aerospace power will not in our lifetime cease to be of value.

The present reprint of Giulio Douhet's classic is a must for anyone interested in the past history and the future employment of Air/Aerospace Power in warfare.

AIR CMDE N. B. SINGH (RETD)

COUNTER INSURGENCY IN KENYA : A STUDY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE MAU MAU, 1952-1960.

BY ANTHONY CLAYTON.

Sun Flower University Press, 1531 Yuma Manhattan USA, 1984,
64 pp. Price not mentioned.

THIS small booklet is one of the series of introductory papers on the important issues in the history of Africa. This deals with one of the aspects of Kenyan history which has not received sufficient attention of military historians or defence experts. Mau-Mau insurgency's causes are a subject of controversy. While some looked upon it as an unusual form of nationalistic protest, others regarded it as a part of internal conflict among the Kikuyu people. The

author has not dealt with this topic in sufficient details as his main thrust was counter-insurgency operations. It is certainly creditable on the part of those who organised counter-insurgency operations against the Mau-Mau to initially contain it and ultimately succeed in suppressing it.

The author has given sufficient details of the evolution of the command structure. In the beginning, the colonial government had not given sufficient attention to the local problems and a Member for African Affairs looked after the local problems of the Africans while law and order problems were dealt with by a Member for Law and Order. However, when the situation began to deteriorate, the Colonial Secretary ordered for tighter control of press, societies and meetings etc. The district officials were given wide powers to deal with the situation. Sir Philip Mitchell who governed Kenya from 1944 to 1952 was of the view that everything was alright there. It was his successor Sir Evelyn Baring who decided to declare State of Emergency. In May 1953, Sir George Erskine was appointed as C in C of Kenya with Nairobi as Headquarters. The author has nicely brought out Erskine's strategy to deal with the insurgents. It was he who rightly pointed out that one of the important causes of the insurgency there was the bad administration. Hence, he demanded an overall command of both military forces and civil administration *i.e.* he wanted those powers for himself which were enjoyed by General Templer in Malaya. Unfortunately, it was denied to him. The study of his strategy becomes all the more important as without these powers he was able to considerably succeed in suppressing the insurgency. Initially, Sitrap Committee (Situation Report) was created on ad hoc basis to contain the activities of the rebels. Later, in 1953, the Colony Emergency Committee comprising the Governor, Dy. Governor, a representative of the GOC, the Chief Secretary, the Members of Finance, Agriculture and African Affairs and the European settlers' leader Michael Blundell was established. The latter was mostly present but was not invited in all the meetings. There was also another committee created known as Dy Directors' Committee (DDO's Committee). While the Colony Emergency Committee initiated policy, the DDO's Committee initiated the action and submitted material for policy decisions. There were committees also at provincial and divisional levels. It is interesting to note that while in Malaya local Malaysians served on local committees, in Kenya, Africans did not serve on regular basis. Finally, in March 1954 Lyttleton Constitution was

introduced that replaced the membership system. Under it, an Executive Council was established which had one nominated African, four elected European and two elected Asian Ministers. In addition there was also a War Council comprising Governor, the GOC and Blundell as Minister without portfolio. It dealt with wide range of problems pertaining to military operations rehabilitation and economic measures.

The author has also described how judicial courts allowed the culprits to go unpunished due to the lack of evidence. With the passage of time, however, the government became firm and death penalty was increasingly imposed for sabotage, carrying of ammunition and explosives, administering certain types of oaths and for supplying and aiding insurgents. Alongwith it, camps were established to impart moral education to win over the population. Three different stages were identified for converting the insurgents into law abiding citizens and separate camps were established for each stage.

The military campaign brings out the skill of Erskine. The operations started with heavy odds against the British troops which were hurriedly collected to deal with the insurgency. The difficult terrain, which created problems of mobility for the British troops, provided good shelter to the insurgents. The insurgents succeeded in the initial stages. Erskine, to contain them, started three important series of operations. First one was to eradicate the strong group of insurgents south of Nyeri by a joint force of British troops and Kikuyu Guards; the second was to destroy insurgents in the Karantina area by the police; and the third was to destroy insurgents between Thika and Muranga. These led to large scale surrender of insurgents in early 1955. Later he first cleared Nairobi city of insurgents, then its surrounding districts and then forests. Alongwith these, the scheme of 'villageization' was also implemented. The author has also brought out how intelligence system was gradually strengthened and improved. The conduct of the security forces was also improved by Erskine.

This work brings out less known aspects of the counter-insurgency operations. It also contains select bibliography. This booklet is a must for all those who have interest in counter-insurgency operations.

—S. D. PRADHAN

THE YEOMANRY REGIMENTS : A PICTORICAL HISTORY**By P.J.R. MILEHAM**

Spellmount Ltd, Tunbridge Wells, Kent. 1985, 128pp. £10.95 (UK)
\$15.95 (USA)

AS its title indicates, the book is profusely illustrated by pictures in colour as well as black and white. It has been forewarded by The Marquess of Anglesey, and the preface has been written by Colonel M. St. J. V. Gibbs. CB, DSO, TD. The author says in his Introduction that the book has been written for the nonspecialised and tells "the story of the Yeomanry from 1794 to the present." The illustrations "show all aspects of service in the Yeomanry in peace and in war."

The author says : "The Yeomanry Cavalry was an exclusive and prestigious organisation. Membership undoubtedly enhanced the social standing of those who joined its ranks, and enabled them to escape the stigma of service in the ranks of the Militia. The aristocratic and land-owning tradition of the Yeomanry persisted very strongly in some areas until quite recent times.

After the Territorial Army was reconstituted in 1947, and later in 1967, Yeomanry regiments were subject to many changes. Some of them struggled as TA & VR III Regiments, but due to lack of equipment and funds, they dwindled gradually. Others managed to retain small cadres. A new major unit of Royal Armoured Corps called the Royal Yeomanry Regiment was formed and in 1969, the Queen's Own Yeomanry (armoured reconnaissance regiment) came into being. The author concludes : "Their present composition continues to reflect modern society but there still exists a recognisable 'Yeomanry spirit' and prestige. The tradition of voluntary military service is maintained, despite the complexities of modern living and modern warfare, at a time when the immediate external danger to the nation is probably more serious than it has ever been."

It is interesting to note that public-spirited ladies of gentle birth were not wanting in playing their part in the service of their motherland. In 1907, the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) was formed in London as an unofficial Corps. It got official recognition in 1927, and later in 1937, it became part of the Women's Transport

Service which served in Britain, India and Kenya. Three of them won George Cross during the Second World War. FANY continues to play its role in the communications branch.

This book contains a good bibliography and an Index. It gives one a good idea of British defence system.

B. CHAKRAVORTY

PRISONER OF WAR

BY MAJOR PAT REID MBE – MC AND MAURICE MICHAEL.

Hamlyn Publishing group limited, London, 1984, 192 pp £ 7.95.

VERY rarely one comes across any good work on Prisoner of War. The authors deserve congratulations for working on this topic and producing the problem in a systematic manner. The authors have discussed how the Prisoner of War was treated in the past. While in the beginning the victors took men, women and children of the defeated area as slaves, later the captives were traded for ransom. The surplus captives were treated with a callous cruelty. The amount of ransom went on increasing for the captives. Knights as prisoners gave the victors not only higher ransom but also increased their prestige. The authors have interestingly brought out how the prisoner of war was indoctrinated and sent back to his own country to act as a subversive agent.

The description of conventions regarding the prisoner of war have added to the value of the book. The authors have described the problems related to the surrender, capture and maintenance of the prisoners of war remarkably well. Their living conditions, the work they have to do and the effects of the captivity are given in sufficient details and with the help of pictures. The efforts made by the prisoners of war to escape is one of the most interesting parts of the book. The book also contains a bibliography and an index. On the whole, the book gives the interesting facts of the prisoner of war in a readable style. It is highly recommended for those who study the problems of wars particularly of prisoners of war.

S. D. PRADHAN

PARTNERS IN VICTORY : MOUNTBATTEN, SLIM AND THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA 1942-45.

By J.S. DULAT.

ABC Publishing House, New Delhi 1983, 247 pp Rs. 96/-

THE author, an old Doon School boy and a former Commissioner of Income-Tax, retired prematurely in 1982 after 30 years of Government service to devote himself whole time to the pursuit of military history. This is his first book.

Dulat believes in the dictum that 'History is about chaps' and has gone into considerable detail about the lives and characters of the two principal actors in the Burma campaign resulting in the victory over the Japanese : viz. Mountbatten and Slim.

Initially, Mountbatten did not show much promise; he passed out 35th from Osborne and 18th from Dartmouth. But, once he decided to do something he did it, and that too, well. For example, as the author says, "he took up Polo seriously, and though an indifferent horseman, mastered the sport by sheer application, so much so that he wrote the excellent 'Introduction to Polo' under the pseudonym of 'Marco', which is still current, and developed a new head for the millet." He had everything—brains, ability to work long hours at speed, superb physical fitness, quickness in decision, sound professional knowledge, capacity to charm at every level, a photographic memory for names and faces, CHARISMA and finally, being a grandson of Queen Victoria, connections in the highest places—. So how could he fail? He stuck to his motto "Full Steam Ahead" whatever the situation, and though at times described as a Jonah succeeded in all major ventures.

For Mountbatten his mother's influence was dominant. Then having married a rich wife, who though she achieved fame in a different sphere, was supportive of her husband's career, he could do almost anything. When on anti-submarine duty towards the end of 1939, the Kelly, which he commanded struck a mine—. But let Dulat continue :—

"A stoker panicked and ran on deck. Mountbatten then mustered the crew and addressed them, saying that while the punishment for such conduct in time of war was death, he was letting the

man off with a caution. He was also cautioning himself for failing, in four months, to impress his own personality on every single one of them. Then he announced Christmas leave for all and Edwina even paid their fare home. How could such a leader not become popular?"

But, how many service Officers have rich wives? Was this not gaining cheap popularity?

He was also theatrical and was not averse to publicity. Hence, he cooperated fully in the making of the film "In Which We Serve", released in September 1942 in which Noel Coward played the part of Mountbatten. The film was an instant hit.

Slim on the other hand came from an essentially middle class background. He knew that his father, a wholesale hardware merchant, could never afford to send him to the Royal Military College. However, he was interested in the army from an early age. Having joined the Officers' Training Corps (O.T.C.) in 1912 at the age of 21 in the University of Birmingham, where his elder brother was studying medicine (he himself was holding the job of a junior clerk at Stewarts and Lloyds) he spent all "his spare time in acquiring the basic skills of the soldier he one day hoped to be." On 22 August 1914 he was gazetted a 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. He saw action on the Sari Bair ridge. Alongside his battalion was a battalion of Gurkhas and having seen them in action, he was determined to join them, which he did when he transferred to the Indian Army after the war.

Wounded in 1915 he was invalided back to England. Then having heard that temporary officers like himself were being considered for regular commissions, he applied and was commissioned as a regular officer on 1 June 1916 and posted to his old battalion. That he was the right type for the army became clear very early in his service and transparently so when he passed "top into the Staff College and top out, earning the coveted "A" grading." He was also one of the more literate and literary soldiers having been Secretary and Editor of the USI Journal (NOT Royal United Service Journal as the author mentions) from 21 May 1930 to 16 March 1931 and again from 1 December 1931 to 31 January 1933.

He was one of the instructors at the Staff College at Camberley by common acclaim of both the Commandant and the students. He

attended the Imperial Defence College in 1937, completed a course at The Senior Officers' School at Belgaum in 1938 and was Commandant of that school in 1939 when war was declared. In September 1939 he took over his first war time command, 10 Infantry Brigade at Jhansi. He led this Brigade as part of 5 Indian Division in Eritrea, in the first offensive operation to be undertaken by the Allies since the outbreak of hostilities, viz. the attempt to capture the Italian fort of Gallabat in 1940. Slim has described this well in his book 'Unofficial History', while the 'British Official History : Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol I' dismisses it in a few words as follows :—

"The hard fact remains that the operation at Gallabat carried out early in November, failed of its object."

Once more 10 Brigade found itself in action in January 1941 pursuing the 41st Italian Colonial Brigade. In this action Slim was wounded, though not seriously. Then in May 1941 he was appointed major general and sent to command 10 Indian Division in Iraq. Here he shone in action and taking a calculated risk won a richly deserved victory at Deir-ez-zor. He was bold in this action and as Wavell said, "A bold general may be lucky, but no general is lucky unless he is bold."

Then he commanded Burma Corps making his name and gaining fame by changing the defeat of the Allied Forces into victory in the campaign against Japan in Burma from 1942 to the surrender at Singapore in 1945.

"UNCLE BILL", as he was popularly known among his officers and men was a determined man (like Mountbatten) and firmly believed that "God helps those who help themselves". The author gives quite a few examples of Slim's following this dictum. Together with Mountbatten the Supremo, whom cynics referred to as "Superbo", Slim formed a "great military partnership" in the history of war, similar, as Dulat makes out, to Marlborough and Godolphin—"Marlborough managed the war and Godolphin managed the Parliament"—. Here Slim the professional was left to deal with the Japanese, while Mountbatten dealt with the big bosses in London and Washington.

The other important character whom Dulat portrays well is General Vinegar Joe Stilwell (Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell)—always wanting to fight—; he was happiest in his dug-out with his

men. His motto in Latin was "ILLEGITIMATI NON CARBORANDUM", which he translated as "Don't let the bastards grind you down". He was convinced that the British were not keen to reconquer Burma, but wanted to wait till the Americans had licked the Japs first. He was not altogether wrong as the British would fight only when they were properly equipped and ready. But he grudgingly admitted that Mountbatten was "the only Limely I've know that wants to fight."

Then we read about the other British generals, such as Scoones, Giffard, Christison, Cowan, Rees, Stopford and Wingate to name a few.

For Wingate the author is full of praise, but Slim, who was no innovator felt that the cost in manpower and material for what was achieved by the Chindits was too high. The same result could have been achieved by regular well trained troops at much less cost. Lentaigne, who took over Wingate's formation on the latter's death, thought the same way as Slim and clearly expressed that view when he was Commandant of the Staff College at Wellington.

The I.N.A. and how it was used by the Japanese has been well brought out by the author, but it would have been worth-while to have obtained the views of some of our officers and men who chose to be Japanese Prisoners of War rather than join the I.N.A. A reference to Brigadier E.D. Smith's book "Battle for Burma" would have been of advantage.

The Engineers, too, have come in for special mention. In December 1944, they completed a 1154 feet (about 351.74 metres) floating Bailey bridge spanning the Chindwin at Kalewa. This is the longest floating Bailey Bridge in the World. Slim's Chief Engineer Hasted, (later E-in-C India) built two gun boats armed with light, weapons for escort purposes. They were named Pamela after the Supremo's younger daughter and Uma after Slim's. Slim later claimed to have been the only general to have commissioned vessels for the Royal Navy! A better partnership between the future Admiral of the Fleet and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Mountbatten) and the future Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Slim) could not be imagined.

The author has taken pains to give some details about the Japanese generals (Tadashi Hanaya, Maraki Honda, Katamura,

Masakazu Kawabe, Heitaro Kimura, Motozo Yanagida and others); also about the slippery Chiang Kai Shek and other Chinese generals.

General Sethna, another old boy of the Doon School, has written a Foreword in which he mentions :—

“One would have wished that some ground had been covered by the author to present the Japanese point of view to give an insight into their side of the story of the campaign in Burma in particular and South-East Asia in general.”

But this is easier said than done, considering the difficulties encountered in getting hold of some of the vast literature and source material even regarding the Allies. Assuming that the author got down to working full time on the book only after he retired in 1982, it would be a very tall order for him to get more information than he has got about the Japanese and the Japanese point of view by the time the publication saw the light of day, viz. 1983.

The author has brought out well the spirit of the Japanese soldier. Slim said the Japanese were the only troops who fought “to the last man and last round”, but who towards the end were so demoralised that hundreds chose surrender rather than death.

But alas, such a readable book has been spoilt by poor production. There are far too many mistakes. One starts with the dust cover which has three spelling errors. Then spelling mistakes increase and one gives up counting as one reads on. The maps themselves are adequate, but the lettering of the headings is poorly done in quite a few cases. On every map the numbering, viz. Map I, Map II, Map III and so on, is poor. It is as if a child has been practising hand-printing and despite its best efforts has a very long way to go in becoming a proficient draftsman.

Though there are many more books on the Burma campaign than those mentioned in the Bibliography, this reviewer feels that the author should have consulted the following and included them in the Bibliography as well :—

- (a) Monsoon Victory by Gerald Handley
- (b) Battle for Burma by Brigadier E.D. Smith
- (c) Unofficial History by Field Marshal Sir William Slim
- (d) The Three Bamboos by R. Standish.

Nevertheless, it is a very gripping book and would give the layman an excellent introduction to the study of the Burma Campaign. Further, provided the production could be improved and the book had no errors, it could be on the 'MUST LIST' for students preparing for the Staff College. It is hoped that this will be done and a second *errorless* edition produced, for undoubtedly the book brings out extremely well the part played by the two main actors on the stage of the Burma Campaign, the two who were from such different backgrounds, but who were such perfect "Partners in the Victory" over the Japanese that their names will rank among the most famous partnerships of military warfare.

"WE DID IT TOGETHER" as Slim told Mountbatten a few weeks before he died on 14 December 1970. Mountbatten literally went with a bang in August 1979, almost as if he had planned a flamboyant death. Both were 79 years old when they died.

BRIG J.A.F. DALAL

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2. Khan, M.A. Islam, Politics and the State : The Pakistan Experience. New Delhi Select Book Service Syndicate, 1986

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3. Vas, E. A. (Lt. Gen.) Terrorism and Insurgency; The Challenge of Modernisation. Dehradun, Natraj Publishers. 1986
4. Raman, N. V. Indian Diplomatic Service : The first thirty four years. New Delhi, Chanakya Publications. 1986
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Vol 1—Economics Review
Vol 2—Statistical Statements.
6. Malik, S. K. (Brig.) The Quranic Concept of War. New Delhi, Himalayan books. 1986
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8. Erickson, J and others Soviet ground forces : An Operational Assessment. Colorado, West-view Press. 1986

9. Dinter, Elmer Hero or Coward; pressures facing the soldier in Battle. London, Frank Cass 1985
10. Howard, Michael The British Way in Warfare; a Re-appraisal, London, Jonathan Cape 1975
11. Barnett, Correlli and others Old Battles and new Defence : Can we learn from Military History, London, Brassey's Def. Pub. 1986
12. Nordeen, Lon O. Jr. Air Warfare in the Missile Age London, Arms and Armour Press 1985
13. Cooper, Mathew The German Air Force : 1933-1945 : an anatomy. London, Jane's Pub. Ltd. 1981
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
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